Conclusions

Abstract

What theoretical and practical conclusions can we draw from the retreat of liberal democracy, the rise of hybrid authoritarian capitalism and the accumulative state in Hungary? Are the theoretical approaches described in the introduction capable of providing a plausible explanation for the retreat of liberal democracy? How does the accumulative state relate to other, historically existing models of authoritarian state capitalism in an international context? What insights does the causal mechanism of Hungary’s authoritarian turn offer for the theory of illiberalism? This chapter attempts to answer these questions. After looking at the causal mechanism from a bird’s-eye view, the chapter summarises the lessons this mechanism presents by drawing the conclusions from the preceding chapters. Next, it analyses the international and historical context by analysing the varieties of authoritarian state capitalisms. Finally, the chapter concludes with broader theoretical and political lessons.

State, capitalism and infrastructure-led development: A multi-scalar analysis of the Belgrade-Budapest railway construction

“…Since Hungary became one of the quintessential global examples of rising authoritarian rule after 2010 (Gerőcs and Ricz, 2021; Kalb and Halmai, 2011), there is a confusing array of concepts applied to describe this increasingly hegemonic regime: ‘ordonationalist’, (Geva, 2021), ‘authoritarian neoliberal’ (Fabry, 2019), ‘neomercantilist’ (Gerőcs, 2021), ‘neo-prebendal managed illiberal democracy’ (Csillag and Szelényi, 2015), or even ‘mafia state’ (Magyar, 2016). Scheiring provides an escape route by summarizing and systematically comparing some of them (Scheiring, 2020). He concludes that Hungary is ruled according to an ‘authoritarian state capitalist’ regime and defines it as an ‘accumulative state’.…”

“…Focusing on the national scale, we claim that the 2008 financial crisis was not only a momentum for Chinese investments’ in Europe, but also for the emergence of a wave of right-wing, authoritarian local hegemonies in Central Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans (Orenstein and Bugarič, 2022). Both Hungary and Serbia are treated as key examples of authoritarian state capitalist regimes (Rogers, 2022; Scheiring, 2020) that pursue specific policies of economic nationalism and build heavily on narratives of Euroscepticism. Both countries articulate different state capitalist modalities which connect national development strategies to global (and regional) investment regimes.…”

“…Hungary has been ruled by the right-wing government of Viktor Orbán with a constitutional majority since 2010. Political economic analyses of this local hegemony argue that – in contrast to the operation of the previous local hegemony that broadly ascribed to liberal values – the politically engaged economic actors of the current regime follow certain sector-specific accumulation strategies which constitute a foundational pillar of the system (Éber et al, 2019; Scheiring, 2020). This explains that in the export-oriented sectors such as manufacturing where foreign investors prevail, local actors are engaged in a classical neoliberal ‘race to the bottom’, while in the sectors of non-tradable goods and infrastructure, a new national bourgeoisie class has managed to gain economic power with the immense help of state regulations (Éber et al, 2019; Geva, 2021).…”

Resistance to Change: Intergenerational Class Mobility in Hungary, 1973–2018

“…On the one hand, although the great economic downturn caused by the global financial crisis may have adversely influenced social mobility, the depression was followed by an unprecedented economic boom that may had an opposite effect if it could have contributed the upgrade of the occupational structure. On the other hand, the right-wing populist turn taken place in Hungary in 2010 has brought with them a wide-ranging elite exchange, which not only affected the political institutions, but also included the creation of a new national bourgeoise and upper middle class loyal to power, which in itself could have increased mobility (Éber, 2020; Scheiring, 2020). In this period, there were, however, significant policy changes as well in terms of education, the labour market, and social policy.…”

“…In addition to the transformation of the political system, there have also been significant changes in social policy (e.g. introduction of a flat tax system for personal income, cutting back the social benefits in the name of the so-called ‘work-based society’, or lowering the age of compulsory education), which have the effect of sharpening social inequalities and increasing distance between the lower and upper classes (Éber, 2020; Scheiring, 2020; Szikra, 2014). These social policy changes may also have significant consequences for the mobility processes of Hungarian society.…”