2014
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-54792-8_3
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Abstract: Abstract. Dolev-Yao models of cryptographic operations constitute the foundation of many successful verification tools for security protocols, such as the protocol verifier ProVerif. Research over the past decade has shown that many of these symbolic abstractions are computationally sound, i.e., the absence of attacks against the abstraction entails the security of suitable cryptographic realizations. Most of these computational soundness (CS) results, however, are restricted to trace properties such as authe…

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