Compromising Reflections-or-How to Read LCD Monitors around the Corner

Backes, Michael; Dürmuth, Markus; Unruh, Dominique

doi:10.1109/sp.2008.25

Cited by 89 publications

(89 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…This rate, also known as the switching frequency, is dynamically adjusted to meet the power requirements of the appliance driven by the SMPS. In sum, the changing power demands of an electronic device cause dynamic adjustments to the SMPS's switching frequency which in turn modulates (2). CFL lamp turning off briefly (3) and then on (4).…”

Section: Technical Foundationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The security community has also explored numerous other classes of information leakage, including: the time to perform various tasks (e.g., [13]), optical emanations (e.g., [19] for network appliances and [15] for CRTs), acoustic emanations (e.g., for printers [4], CPUs [26], and keyboards [1]), and reflections (e.g., [2]). There is also security research focused on the modern television showing that it is possible to infer what someone is watching over an encrypted wireless video stream from the size of the transmitted packets [25]; that approach exploits information leakage through variable bitrate encoding schemes, which was pioneered in [29].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For experimental feasibility, we opted to create a 20 movie database. To make our movie selec- 2 We recognize that a 'Line Impedance Stabilization Network' LISN device would have provided a more optimally stable and repeatable signal; however, we expect a LISN to only improve the already high matching accuracies achieved with our acquisition hardware. Table 2: List of twenty movies that we included in our dataset selected such that they span various genres.…”

Section: Selection Of Tvs and Moviesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Televisions, video privacy, and powerline electromagnetic interference

Enev

Gupta

Kohno

et al. 2011

Proceedings of the 18th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security

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We conduct an extensive study of information leakage over the powerline infrastructure from eight televisions (TVs) spanning multiple makes, models, and underlying technologies. In addition to being of scientific interest, our findings contribute to the overall debate of whether or not measurements of residential powerlines reveal significant information about the activities within a home. We find that the power supplies of modern TVs produce discernible electromagnetic interference (EMI) signatures that are indicative of the video content being displayed. We measure the stability of these signatures over time and across multiple instances of the same TV model, as well as the robustness of these signatures in the presence of other noisy electronic devices connected to the same powerline.

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Section: Technical Foundationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Selection Of Tvs and Moviesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Televisions, video privacy, and powerline electromagnetic interference

Enev

Gupta

Kohno

et al. 2011

Proceedings of the 18th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security

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“…They are not compatible (incompatible) if they overlap. For example, for A = 01234, edit (1,3) and (4, 1) are compatible whereas (1, 4) and (4, 1) are incompatible.…”

Section: Definitions and Notationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To distinguish this from the scenario of covert channels, the term side channel was used. Side channels abound and have been the focus of much research in areas like cryptographic hardware [11], API design [5] or non-electronic media [3].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Detecting Hidden Storage Side Channel Vulnerabilities in Networked Applications

Freiling

Schinzel

2011

IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology

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Abstract. Side channels are communication channels that were not intended for communication and that accidentally leak information. A storage side channel leaks information through the content of the channel and not its timing behavior. Storage side channels are a large problem in networked applications since the output at the level of the protocol encoding (e.g., HTTP and HTML) often depends on data and control flow. We call such channels hidden because the output differences blend with the noise of the channel. Within a formal system model, we give a necessary and sufficient condition for such storage side channels to exist. Based on this condition, we develop a method to detect this kind of side channels. The method is based on systematic comparisons of network responses of web applications. We show that this method is useful in practice by exhibiting hidden storage side channels in three well-known web applications: Typo3, Postfix Admin, and Zenith Image Gallery.

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Corneal Imaging

Nitschke¹,

Nakazawa²

2017

The Wiley Handbook of Human Computer Interaction

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Compromising Reflections-or-How to Read LCD Monitors around the Corner

Cited by 89 publications

References 9 publications

Televisions, video privacy, and powerline electromagnetic interference

Televisions, video privacy, and powerline electromagnetic interference

Detecting Hidden Storage Side Channel Vulnerabilities in Networked Applications

Corneal Imaging

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