A round 2005, freelance journalist Phillip Longman was asked by Fortune magazine to write a feature article about a healthcare organization that was doing everything right. After extensive investigation, he wrote a story about the remarkable transformation of the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), but Fortune found this answer unsatisfactory. So he wrote a book 1 that cited extensive evidence claiming that VHA healthcare was second to none. In this issue of JGIM, O'Hanlon et al. present an updated review of the evidence on VHA's quality of care. 2 Given the recent controversies surrounding the VHA, some might find these authors' review difficult to believe. It is certainly true that some of the articles cited could be criticized for potential favorable selection (such as over-sampling academic-affiliated VHA facilities) and that the measurement approaches inside and outside the VHA differed. However, most of evidence the authors cite comes from national or representative VHA samples and present a very strong scientific case to support their main conclusion-that at least for common performance metrics, the available evidence suggests that the quality and safety measures of the VHA were truly as good as or better than those in the private sector, even top-rated managed care organizations. 2 More remarkably, the VHA had been widely viewed in the 1970s and 1980s as an inefficient safety-net provider at best. Its turnaround in the 1990s under VHA Undersecretary Ken Kizer was one of the most dramatic in healthcare history. How did this happen? Is the controversy over wait times evidence that the VHA has since reverted to old ways? If so, how can the VHA find its way again?
LOOSE-TIGHT LEADERSHIP/MANAGEMENTI believe that three organizational changes were particularly important in the VHA's transformation: 1) VHA facilities were divided into manageable (just more than 20) Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISNs) that had reasonably similar patient populations and healthcare delivery challenges, making comparison of their performance much easier; 2) both resources and decision-making authority were principally distributed to these VISNs, thereby delegating day-to-day decision-making power to those with the most information about their local resources and environments; and 3) each VISN leader was held strictly accountable for success, with success monitored by carefully chosen measures of quality and efficiency. In other words, the VHA Central Office meddled little in day-to-day operations (loose = minimal micromanagement), but held VISNs strictly accountable for central values such as quality and efficiency (tight = strict accountability for performance). Moreover, the VHA Central Office evaluation system was created such that a given VISN's success was not predicated on another's failure. This form of managed competition between VISNs created a cooperative, positive culture of collaborative continuous improvement. Further, when leaders in the field brought strong arguments to the national leaders, the Central Off...