Commitment and Consequences: Reneging on Cosponsorship Pledges in the U.S. House

Abstract

We argue that bill cosponsorship in Congress represents an institutional arrangement that provides credibility to commitments of support. We predict that if cosponsorship fosters legislative deals, MCs will only rarely back out on their pledges to support a bill if it comes up for a floor vote, and when they do, these choices will reflect strategic calculations. Further, legislators who violate their cosponsorship agreements will face punishment from colleagues, compromising their ability to gain support for their own bills. We explore the causes and effects of MCs' choices to renege on a pledge by voting no on a bill for which they were a cosponsor, focusing on all cosponsorship decisions in the 101st–108th Houses. The results reveal that patterns of reneging and its consequences are consistent with the idea that cosponsorship functions as a commitment mechanism.

Representation, Competing Principals, and Waffling on Bills in US Legislatures

“…Some of these “hostile” amendments simply moderate otherwise extreme legislation, while others directly contradict the initial purpose of the bill. Thus, a somewhat different argument about waffling than the one we offer might suggest that legislators sponsor or cosponsor bills they support and then vote against those bills because the bills have been altered in some important way (Bernhard and Sulkin ). Legislators whose constituents are ideologically far from the majority of their own party and their party's leadership would seem to be the most likely legislators to have their legislation dramatically changed through the legislative process.…”

“…Bernhard and Sulkin () examine “reneging” behavior—when a cosponsor votes against a bill at final passage—in the House over the period 1989–2004. They find that reneging is quite rare and is determined by several factors, including the sponsor‐cosponsor relationship.…”

“…A reneging legislator is less likely to receive sponsors to his or her own legislation and experiences a drop in his or her percentage of sponsored bills that pass the chamber. Bernhard and Sulkin () ultimately conclude that cosponsorship is a credible sign of commitment, and thus reneging on a commitment is not a choice that legislators make lightly.…”

“…1 Krehbiel finds that legislator preferences are the strongest determinants of waffling, influencing the process more than partisanship or electoral factors. Bernhard and Sulkin (2013) examine "reneging" behavior-when a cosponsor votes against a bill at final passage-in the House over the period [1989][1990][1991][1992][1993][1994][1995][1996][1997][1998][1999][2000][2001][2002][2003][2004]. They find that reneging is quite rare and is determined by several factors, including the sponsor-cosponsor relationship.…”

La coalición de la Alianza en Argentina (1999-2001): un caso entre bloques

“…La red formada a través de las acciones cooperantes destaca dos aspectos relevantes: la similitud de las preferencias políticas y la intensidad de la preferencia sobre determinadas áreas de política (Fowler, 2006). El valor del copatrocinio es definirse como una estrategia voluntaria en el ámbito de la relación social legislativa que se diferencia de una votación, acción donde los legisladores están obligados a emitir votos sobre proyectos (Bernhard y Sulkin, 2009). …”