Commentary on Susan Meld Shell's ‘Kant on Just War and “Unjust Enemies”: Reflections on a “Pleonasm“’

Abstract

In her essay (in Kantian Review 10 (2005), 82–111), Shell wants to demonstrate that 1. Kant's theory of the right of nations ‘can furnish us with some much needed practical help and guidance’, and 2. ‘Kant is less averse to the use of force, including resort to pre-emptive war… than he is often taken to be’ (p. 82). The first claim is unconvincing. The second one is in need of clarification. Shell turns Kant into a kind of realist and just-war theorist, into a liberal who is prejudiced against illiberal regimes. In the end, her Kant is closer to Locke, Vattel and other early liberal international lawyers than to himself. Almost all that is unique in Kant's theory of the right of nations gets lost. In this, Shell follows a general trend among some Kant interpreters: the interpretation is only loosely based on Kant; it claims to follow his ‘spirit’ and offers creative ‘Kantian perspectives’. Amidst interpretational creativity, Kant's texts more or less disappear in the mist.

The Limits of Kant’s Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Practice, and the Crisis in Syria

“…Although admittedly it is short of a cosmopolitan arrangement, the existence of the United Nations and numerous treaties and covenants seem also to entail that war would almost always be wrong, short of defending oneself against outright aggression. This has led several theorists, including Georg Cavallar (1999, 2006), Thomas Mertens (2007), and Howard Williams (2012), to defend versions of Kantian cosmopolitanism that verge on pacifism. For all of them, our efforts to defend human rights or intervene in despotic states must be constrained by existing external law, specifically the will of the international community that is represented by the UN.…”

Intervention and Non-Intervention in Classical International Political Theory: Immanuel Kant and J.S. Mill

“…70 Georg Cavallar is prepared to entertain that "Kant might have favoured intervention to stop dramatic violations of human rights (for example genocide)". 71 Franceschet is predictably more forthright: "The idea that a state that would commit or allow genocide or would otherwise deny its population their basic moral rights or humanity is not only inconceivable but conceptually impossible for Kant". 72 Howard Williams acknowledges the opening that may arise from Kant"s support for universal human rights and "a moral responsibility to be concerned about how citizens in other states are treated by their governments", 73 but asserts that this does not lead to "active involvement of our government in attempting to redress or punish wrongs in other states".…”

Intervention and non-intervention in international political theory

“…23 Despite the prohibition set out in Preliminary Article 5, several scholars have tried to prove that he did not reject intervention or humanitarian intervention. There are three main positions: (1) the view that Kant upholds a rigid principle of non-intervention; 24 (2) guarded assertion that had he been faced with or contemplated massive atrocities, he would have been more open to intervention qua humani tarian intervention; 25 and (3) claims that he was in fact supportive of humanitarian intervention. 26 One line of reasoning is to link Preliminary Article 5 with Kant's First Definite Article, which reads as follows: 'The Civil Constitution of Every State shall be Republican'.…”

“…43 Georg Cavallar is prepared to entertain that 'Kant might have favoured intervention to stop dramatic violations of human rights (for example genocide)'. 44 Franceschet is predictably more forthright: 'The idea that a state that would commit or allow genocide or would otherwise deny its population their basic moral rights or humanity is not only inconceivable but conceptually impossible for Kant'. 45 Howard Williams acknowledges the opening that may arise from Kant's support for universal human rights and 'a moral responsibility to be concerned about how citizens in other states are treated by their governments', 46 but asserts that this does not lead to the 'active involvement of our government in attempting to redress or punish wrongs in other states'.…”