Combining Safety and Security Analysis for Industrial Collaborative Automation Systems

Plósz, Sándor; Schmittner, Christoph; Varga, Pál

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-66284-8_16

“…The analysis proposed by [18] is based on FMEA that considers only single causes of an effect, which excludes multi-stage attacks consideration. The method presented by Popov (2015) [28] may require a more complex [24], [32], [40], [45], [46] [11], [33] Unified [6], [13], [15], [17], [23], [25], [34], [36], [39], [41], [42], [43], [35], [49] [10], [12], [18], [21], [26], [28], [29], [31], [37], [38], [44], [47] failure model to address failure dependencies and trade-offs between safety and security. The approach proposed by Wei et al (2015) [31] has a limitation in terms of failures connections.…”

Section: B Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The authors demonstrate how to align safety and security workflows and where they need to overlap. 28) Plósz et al (2017) [43] propose a method combining parts of existing methodologies, STRIDE [20] and FMEA [19]. These safety and security analyses are divided in two parts with an integration stage after the first parallel activities that provides a combined safety and security threat catalogue.…”

Section: ) Raspotning Et Al (2012) [10] Present Combined Harmmentioning

confidence: 99%

Safety and Security Co-Analyses: A Systematic Literature Review

Lisova

¹

,

Šljivo

²

,

Čaušević

³

2019

IEEE Systems Journal

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Latest technological trends lead towards systems connected to public networks even in critical domains. Bringing together safety and security work is becoming imperative, as a connected safety-critical system is not safe if it is not secure. The main objective of this study is to investigate the current status of safety and security co-analysis in system engineering by conducting a Systematic Literature Review. The steps of the review are the following: the research questions identification; agreement upon a search string; applying the search string to chosen databases; a selection criterion formulation for the relevant publications filtering; selected papers categorization and analysis. We focused on the early system development stages and identified 33 relevant publications categorized as: combined safety and security approaches that consider the mutual influence of safety and security; safety informed security approaches that consider influence of safety on security; security informed safety approaches that consider influence of security on safety. The results showed that a number of identified approaches are driven by needs in fast developing application areas, e.g., automotive, while works focusing on combined analysis are mostly application area independent. Overall, the study shows that safety and security co-analysis is still a developing domain.

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“…The analysis proposed by [18] is based on FMEA that considers only single causes of an effect, which excludes multi-stage attacks consideration. The method presented by Popov (2015) [28] may require a more complex [24], [32], [40], [45], [46] [11], [33] Unified [6], [13], [15], [17], [23], [25], [34], [36], [39], [41], [42], [43], [35], [49] [10], [12], [18], [21], [26], [28], [29], [31], [37], [38], [44], [47] failure model to address failure dependencies and trade-offs between safety and security. The approach proposed by Wei et al (2015) [31] has a limitation in terms of failures connections.…”

Section: B Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Safety and Security Co-Analyses: A Systematic Literature Review

Lisova

¹

,

Šljivo

²

,

Čaušević

³

2019

2019 IEEE 43rd Annual Computer Software and Applications Conference (COMPSAC)

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Latest technological trends lead towards systems connected to public networks even in critical domains. Bringing together safety and security work is becoming imperative, as a connected safety-critical system is not safe if it is not secure. The main objective of this study is to investigate the current status of safety and security co-analysis in system engineering by conducting a Systematic Literature Review. The steps of the review are the following: the research questions identification; agreement upon a search string; applying the search string to chosen databases; a selection criterion formulation for the relevant publications filtering; selected papers categorization and analysis. We focused on the early system development stages and identified 33 relevant publications categorized as: combined safety and security approaches that consider the mutual influence of safety and security; safety informed security approaches that consider influence of safety on security; security informed safety approaches that consider influence of security on safety. The results showed that a number of identified approaches are driven by needs in fast developing application areas, e.g., automotive, while works focusing on combined analysis are mostly application area independent. Overall, the study shows that safety and security co-analysis is still a developing domain.

show abstract

“…We want to start with approaches explicitly recommended for the automotive sector and listed by SAE in its Cybersecurity Guidebook for Cyber-Physical Vehicle Systems (SAE J3061 [14]). The guidebook suggests to apply the Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) approach, the HEAling Vulnerabilities to ENhance Software Security and Safety (HEAVENS) [15] methodology, and the E-Safety Vehicle Intrusion Protected Applications (EVITA) [16] [17] approach. OCTAVE was developed for enterprise security risk assessment.…”

Section: Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Enhancement of Automotive Penetration Testing with Threat Analyses Results

Dürrwang¹,

Braun²,

Rumez³

et al. 2018

SAE Int. J. Cybersecurity

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In this work, we present an approach to support penetration tests by combining safety and security analyses to enhance automotive security testing. Our approach includes a new way to combine safety and threat analyses to derive possible test cases. We reuse outcomes of a performed safety analysis as the input for a threat analysis. We show systematically how to derive test cases and we present the applicability of our approach by deriving and performing test cases for a penetration test of an automotive Electronic Control Unit (ECU). Therefore, we selected an airbag control unit due to its safety-critical functionality. During the penetration test, the selected control unit was installed on a test bench and we were able to successfully exploit a discovered vulnerability, causing the detonation of airbags.

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Combining Safety and Security Analysis for Industrial Collaborative Automation Systems

Cited by 21 publications

References 10 publications

Safety and Security Co-Analyses: A Systematic Literature Review

Safety and Security Co-Analyses: A Systematic Literature Review

Safety and Security Co-Analyses: A Systematic Literature Review

Enhancement of Automotive Penetration Testing with Threat Analyses Results

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