Cognitive Style and Frame Susceptibility in Decision-Making

Mandel, David R.; Kapler, Irina V.

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01461

Cited by 10 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 86 publications

(133 reference statements)

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“…The more important question is whether associations of this magnitude favor the dualprocess account. Basing our expected effect size on previous research (Pennycook, Cheyne, et al, 2015;Rachev et al, 2021;Toplak et al, 2011;Turpin et al, 2019), we implicitly set the smallest effect size of interest (Lakens, 2017) to a value that might seem too low to critics of the dual-process account of framing (Mandel & Kapler, 2018). Our results show that neither overclaiming nor ignoring the role of thinking dispositions in resisting framing is warranted.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 72%

Actively Open-Minded Thinking, Bullshit Receptivity, and Susceptibility to Framing: Evaluating the Dual-Process Account in North America and Bulgaria

Rachev¹,

Geiger²,

Vintr³

et al. 2022

Preprint

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The framing effect occurs when different presentations of the same problem lead to predictably different preferences. The dual-process framework of higher cognition assumes that the effect violates rational principles, but alternative accounts and recent evidence have contested this interpretation. Contributing to this debate, we tested the dual-process assumption by investigating associations between susceptibility to framing and the willingness and ability to think in line with rational norms, conceptualized as actively open-minded thinking and pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity. We conducted two online studies among North American (N = 259) and Bulgarian (N = 248) university students and administered several framing problems within subjects, presumably a necessary condition for the associations to appear. Confirmatory factor analyses showed that susceptibility to framing was associated with decreased actively open-minded thinking and increased bullshit receptivity in both sites. Exploratory multi-group analyses demonstrated partial strong invariance and showed that the findings generalize across both sites in terms of direction and partially in terms of magnitude. These results broadly support the dual-process account of the framing effect. Our study further contributes to adapting existing measures to a novel setting and expanding the findings across borders and populations.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 72%

Actively Open-Minded Thinking, Bullshit Receptivity, and Susceptibility to Framing: Evaluating the Dual-Process Account in North America and Bulgaria

Rachev¹,

Geiger²,

Vintr³

et al. 2022

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Buy / Rent full text

show abstract

“…The experiment also included a test of numeracy. Some studies have shown that less numerate participants display stronger framing effects (Peters et al, ), whereas other studies show that numeracy is not related to susceptibility to framing (Mandel & Kapler, ). Hence, we wanted to explore whether people's understanding of statistics relates to their thinking about expert disagreement in the context of framing.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Framing experts' (dis)agreements about uncertain environmental events

et al. 2019

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Agreements and disagreements between expert statements influence lay people's beliefs. But few studies have examined what is perceived as a disagreement. We report six experiments where people rated agreement between pairs of probabilistic statements about environmental events, attributed to two different experts or to the same expert at two different points in time. The statements differed in frame, by focusing on complementary outcomes (45% probability that smog will have negative health effects vs. 55% probability that it will not have such effects), in probability level (45% vs. 55% probability of negative effects), or in both respects. Opposite frames strengthened disagreement when combined with different probability levels. Approximate probabilities can be “framed” in yet another way by indicating reference values they are “over” or “under”. Statements that use different directional verbal terms (over vs. under 50%) indicated greater disagreement than statements with the same directional term but different probability levels (over 50% vs. over 70%). Framing and directional terms similarly affected consistency judgments when both statements were issued by the same expert at different occasions. The effect of framing on perceived agreement was significant for medium (10 and 20 percentage points) differences between probabilities, whereas the effect of directional term was stable for numerical differences up to 40 percentage points. To emphasize agreement between different estimates, they should be framed in the same way. To accentuate disagreements or changes of opinion, opposite framings should be used.

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“…It is thus possible to test the dual-process account of framing by investigating whether susceptibility to framing is related to one’s willingness and ability to think by rational norms. Using this approach, Mandel and Kapler (2018) failed to find a reliable association between susceptibility to framing and various measures of analytic cognitive style or the propensity to rely on Type 2 rather than Type 1 processes. Pointing to similarly weak relations in previous studies (e.g., West et al, 2008), they concluded that “any theory positing that framing effects are largely due to reliance on heuristic ‘System 1’ reasoning processes is wrong” (p. 10).…”

Section: The Framing Effect: a Thinking Bias?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Actively Open-Minded Thinking, Bullshit Receptivity, and Susceptibility to Framing

Rachev

Geiger

Vintr

et al. 2022

European Journal of Psychological Assessment

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Abstract. The framing effect occurs when different presentations of the same problem lead to predictably different preferences. The dual-process framework of higher cognition assumes that the effect violates rational principles, but alternative accounts and recent evidence have contested this interpretation. Contributing to this debate, we tested the dual-process assumption by investigating associations between susceptibility to framing and the willingness and ability to think in line with rational norms, conceptualized as actively open-minded thinking and pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity. We conducted two online studies among North American ( N = 259) and Bulgarian ( N = 248) university students and administered several framing problems within-subjects, presumably necessary for the associations to appear. Confirmatory factor analyses showed that susceptibility to framing was associated with decreased actively open-minded thinking and increased bullshit receptivity in both sites. Exploratory multi-group analyses demonstrated partial strong invariance and showed that the findings generalize across both sites in terms of direction and partially in terms of magnitude. These results broadly support the dual-process account of the framing effect. Our study further contributes to adapting existing measures to a novel setting and expanding the findings across borders and populations.

show abstract

Cognitive Style and Frame Susceptibility in Decision-Making

Cited by 10 publications

References 86 publications

Actively Open-Minded Thinking, Bullshit Receptivity, and Susceptibility to Framing: Evaluating the Dual-Process Account in North America and Bulgaria

Actively Open-Minded Thinking, Bullshit Receptivity, and Susceptibility to Framing: Evaluating the Dual-Process Account in North America and Bulgaria

Framing experts' (dis)agreements about uncertain environmental events

Actively Open-Minded Thinking, Bullshit Receptivity, and Susceptibility to Framing

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