2016
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.06.006
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Abstract: Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in… Show more

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Cited by 33 publications
(28 citation statements)
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References 71 publications
(70 reference statements)
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“…Everett, Pizarro, & Crockett, 2016) as well as in response to observed, concrete behavior (e.g. people assign either themselves or their partners to an onerous task (Simpson & Harrell, 2013) or donate some amount to charity (Fehrler & Przepiorka, 2016). Perhaps the most representative paradigm is when a participant chooses between two (or more) potential partners for an economic interaction, whether that be a trust game (see Table 1 for a description of this and other economic games referenced here) (Bornhorst, Ichino, Kirchkamp, Schlag, & Winter, 2010;Bostyn & Roets, 2017;Everett et al, 2016;Fehrler & Przepiorka, 2016;Pleasant & Barclay, 2018), a prisoner's dilemma (Aksoy, 2015), or a dictator game (Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006;.…”
Section: Many Modes Of Partner Choicementioning
confidence: 99%
See 4 more Smart Citations
“…Everett, Pizarro, & Crockett, 2016) as well as in response to observed, concrete behavior (e.g. people assign either themselves or their partners to an onerous task (Simpson & Harrell, 2013) or donate some amount to charity (Fehrler & Przepiorka, 2016). Perhaps the most representative paradigm is when a participant chooses between two (or more) potential partners for an economic interaction, whether that be a trust game (see Table 1 for a description of this and other economic games referenced here) (Bornhorst, Ichino, Kirchkamp, Schlag, & Winter, 2010;Bostyn & Roets, 2017;Everett et al, 2016;Fehrler & Przepiorka, 2016;Pleasant & Barclay, 2018), a prisoner's dilemma (Aksoy, 2015), or a dictator game (Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006;.…”
Section: Many Modes Of Partner Choicementioning
confidence: 99%
“…people assign either themselves or their partners to an onerous task (Simpson & Harrell, 2013) or donate some amount to charity (Fehrler & Przepiorka, 2016). Perhaps the most representative paradigm is when a participant chooses between two (or more) potential partners for an economic interaction, whether that be a trust game (see Table 1 for a description of this and other economic games referenced here) (Bornhorst, Ichino, Kirchkamp, Schlag, & Winter, 2010;Bostyn & Roets, 2017;Everett et al, 2016;Fehrler & Przepiorka, 2016;Pleasant & Barclay, 2018), a prisoner's dilemma (Aksoy, 2015), or a dictator game (Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006;. Closely related are contexts in which participants interact with a partner and decide whether they would like to play an economic game with that partner again or with a different partner, either in a subsequent dyadic context (Barclay & Willer, 2007;Coricelli, Fehr, & Fellner, 2004;Eisenbruch & Roney, 2017;Gross, Leib, Offerman, & Shalvi, 2018;Martin & Cushman, 2015;Sylwester & Roberts, 2010 or a group context (Liddell & Kruschke, 2014;Page, Putterman, & Unel, 2005;Rockenbach & Milinski, 2011).…”
Section: Many Modes Of Partner Choicementioning
confidence: 99%
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