Choice blindness and choice-induced preference change in groups

Abstract

Contrary to common belief, our preferences do not only shape our decisions but are also shaped by what decisions we make. This effect, known as choice-induced preference change, has been extensively studied in individuals. Here we document choice-induced preference change in groups. We do so by using the choice-blindness paradigm, a method by which participants are given false feedback about their past choices. Participants are given a second round of choices following the choice blindness manipulation´measuring preference change resulting from accepting the manipulation. In Experiment 1 (N=83), we introduce a roommate selection task used in this paper and use it to replicate choice-induced preference change using choice-blindness in individuals. In Experiment 2 (N=160), dyad members made mutual choices in the roommate selection task and then receive either veridical or false feedback about what choice they made. The majority of the false feedback trials were accepted by the dyads as their own choices, thereby demonstrating choice blindness in dyads for the first time. Dyads exhibited choice-induced preference change and were more likely to choose the originally rejected option on trials where they accepted the manipulation compared to control trials. In Experiment 3 (N=80), we show that the preference effect induced by the choice blindness manipulation at the group level does not generalize back to follow up choices made by individual participants when removed from the group. In all studies, response time analyses further support our conclusions. Choice-induced preference change exists for both individuals and groups, but the level at which the choice was made constrains the influence of that choice on later preferences.

The right face at the wrong place: How motor intentions can override outcome monitoring

“…In addition, CB-induced preference change suggests that illusory self-attributions or rejections of choices are integrated into people’s preferences. 34 , 35 , 36 , 37 , 38 This preference change can even be long lasting, persisting at least one week after the experiment. 36 Hence, it is very likely that illusory attributions and related preference change observed in our experiment reflect a genuine phenomenon.…”

Looking at choice blindness: Evidence from gaze patterns and pupil dilation

“…By studying the dynamics of false feedback and correction in the choice blindness paradigm we can hope to attain a more fine-grained model of how the task environment interacts with cognitive systems during choice. Furthermore, given the possibilities of using choice blindness not only to study our reactions to feedback in the environment, but how beliefs in our choice build our future preferences (P. Pärnamets, von Zimmermann, et al, 2020) and ideological leanings (Strandberg et al, 2020;Strandberg et al, 2018), understanding these processes is of continued importance to our understanding of ourselves as imperfect cognitive agents.…”

“…On manipulated trials, using experimental subterfuge, participants receive false feedback about their choice. In the original work on choice blindness participants chose between pairs of faces which they preferred (P. Johansson et al, 2005), but the effect has since been both replicated (P. Luo & Yu, 2017;Sauerland et al, 2016;Taya et al, 2014) and extended to a variety of choice domains including moral (Hall et al, 2012;Vranka & Bahník, 2016) and political attitudes (Hall et al, 2013;Strandberg et al, 2020;Strandberg et al, 2018), financial decisions (McLaughlin & Somerville, 2013), risk preferences (Kusev et al, 2022), food and drink preferences (Cheung et al, 2016), eye-witness lineup decisions (Cochran et al, 2016;Sagana et al, 2014a), as well as, decisions made in groups (Pärnamets, von Zimmermann, et al, 2020). In these experiments, participants will accept an outcome opposite to their intended in between a third to a full eighty percent of trials.…”