Chasing votes with the public budget

Tribín, Ana

doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101875

Cited by 7 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…Alternatively, we introduce a squared term of the variable victory margin to examine whether Greek governments opted to divert projects towards prefectures with weak support (i.e., swing prefectures) if they believe that their core supporters are going to vote for them unconditionally. If the swing voter argument can explain our results, a positive coe cient on victory margin and a negative coe cient on its squared term are to be expected (see Jablonski, 2014;Tribin, 2020).…”

Section: Preliminary Evidence: Fixed-effects Regressionsmentioning

confidence: 74%

“…Our rst robustness check is to experiment with an alternative political support measure to add validity in our argument that our ndings are explained by the core voter hypothesis. In particular, we replace the continuous variable incumbent share with a dichotomous classi cation that allows us to identify the most traditional political strongholds of the two parties (see, e.g., Tribin, 2020). The variable stronghold takes the value 1 if ND and PASOK have won at the prefecture level for all four elections from 1974 to 1985.…”

Section: Robustness Checksmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Investing in the roots of your political ancestors

Kammas

Poulima

Sarantides

2022

Preprint

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Using regional data for Greece, we document the disproportionate allocation of public investment funds in favor of prefectures with many core supporters of the incumbent party. Our main evidence comes from an Instrumental Variables (IV) analysis that exploits the discontinuity in the political landscape of Greece after a brief military junta (1967-1974) to link the parties established after 1974 with their ancestors from the same ‘political family’ during the pre-dictatorial era. In particular, we show that political ancestors’ electoral strength affects the allocation of public investment, the political support between political ancestor and descendant parties is strongly associated and that both push the allocation of public investment in prefectures with many core supporters. We also provide evidence that the appointment of deputy ministers from the loyal prefectures of the incumbent party plays an important role in this relationship. JEL classification: H1; H4; D7

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Section: Preliminary Evidence: Fixed-effects Regressionsmentioning

confidence: 74%

Section: Robustness Checksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Investing in the roots of your political ancestors

Kammas

Poulima

Sarantides

2022

Preprint

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“…Ortega (2004) proposed a model in which voting by immigrants affects the immigration policies sought by skilled and unskilled domestic labor. 14 On politicized taxation, see Tribin (2020). 15 We do not address issues of self-selection in immigration.…”

Section: Immigrantsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Immigrants as future voters

Hillman

Long

2021

Public Choice

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Immigration policies in western democracies have often been contrary to the predictions of the mainstream theory of international economics. Political parties that are predicted to adopt policies beneficial for lower-income constituents have not protected workers from labor-market competition. Nor have workers been protected from a fiscal burden of financing incomes and benefits for welfare-dependent immigrants. We explain the contradiction by immigrants being future voters. We give a hearing to alternative interpretations.

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“…De acuerdo con su hipótesis, el gobernante en ejercicio busca maximizar su propio beneficio, por lo cual tiene incentivos a manejar el gasto para garantizar su reelección. Los resultados de Tribin (2014) sugieren que el gobernante hace uso de los bienes públicos como mecanismo de recompensa a sus partidarios y utiliza las transferencias monetarias para persuadir a los votantes.…”

Section: Las Investigaciones Deunclassified

Ciclo político en las finanzas de los gobiernos regionales de Colombia 1998-2014

Granger-Castaño¹,

Hernández-Turca²,

Murcia-Bustos³

et al. 2018

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Las opiniones contenidas en el presente documento son responsabilidad exclusiva de los autores y no comprometen al Banco de la República ni a su Junta Directiva. Resumen:Este artículo busca comprobar la presencia de ciclos políticos sobre las finanzas de los gobiernos regionales de Colombia durante el periodo 1998-2014. A partir de una base de datos que contiene información detallada de la situación fiscal y los resultados electorales de una muestra representativa de municipios y departamentos, se estiman modelos de panel dinámicos mediante el Método Generalizado de Momentos -MGM-. Los resultados de las estimaciones muestran evidencia del ciclo político en las finanzas territoriales, al corroborar la existencia de aumentos de los gastos y el déficit fiscal durante los años electorales. De forma complementaria, se realiza un análisis con la información de finalidad de gasto, donde se revela que en los periodos de elecciones los gobernantes tienden a incrementar los gastos de inversión más visibles, dentro de los cuales se destacan la inversión en carreteras, infraestructura y servicios públicos. Clasificación JEL: C33, D72, H70Palabras Clave: Ciclo político, finanzas públicas, gobiernos regionales, datos panel. Abstract:This article evaluates the presence of political cycles on the finances of Colombian local governments during the period 1998-2014. Based on a database, which contains detailed information about the fiscal situation and the electoral results of a representative sample of municipalities and departments, we estimate dynamic panel models using the Generalized Method of Moments -GMM-. The results of the estimations show evidence of the political cycle in the subnational finances. The estimates corroborate the existence of increases in expenditures and fiscal deficit during electoral years. Complementarily, we carry out an analysis with information about the purpose of the expenditure, which reveals that during the election periods the governments tend to increase the most visible investment expenditures, among which are the investment in roads, infrastructure and public services.JEL classification: C33, D72, H70

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Chasing votes with the public budget

Cited by 7 publications

References 34 publications

Investing in the roots of your political ancestors

Investing in the roots of your political ancestors

Immigrants as future voters

Ciclo político en las finanzas de los gobiernos regionales de Colombia 1998-2014

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