2013
DOI: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2012.11.005 View full text |Buy / Rent full text
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Abstract: It has been shown that psychological predispositions to benefit others can motivate human cooperation and the evolution of such social preferences can be explained with kin or multi-level selection models. It has also been shown that cooperation can evolve as a costly signal of an unobservable quality that makes a person more attractive with regard to other types of social interactions. Here we show that if a proportion of individuals with social preferences is maintained in the population through kin or multi… Show more

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“…This part of the experiment replicates the set-up of our previous study (Fehrler and Przepiorka 2013). …”
Section: Experimental Designsupporting
“…In the context of firms, it has been argued that corporate social responsibility (CSR) might serve as a signal of trustworthiness (Vlachos et al 2008;Elfenbein et al 2012), and other studies suggest that charitable giving by candidates might serve the same purpose in political competitions (Milinski et al 2002;Hamman et al 2011). Consistent with these conjectures, Fehrler and Przepiorka (2013) show, in an experiment with a modified trust game, that subjects transfer more to donors because they expect donors to be more trustworthy than non-donors.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
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“…It has been argued that a good reputation could not only allow for partner choice in cooperative interactions or receiving more help in future interactions (Alexander, 1987;Roberts, 1998), but also that it might be linked to the actor's quality (Zahavi, 1977), serving as an honest signal conveying information on the actor's resources, capabilities or reproductive quality for example (Barclay, 2013;Fehrler & Przepiorka, 2013;Tognetti et al, 2014). Consequently, costs of generosity in collective action dilemmas might be outweighed in other various contexts.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
“…A donor may demonstrate attractiveness as a potential producer of joint profits by giving that signals wealth (Glazer and Konrad, 1996), valuable skills, or support of a code that dictates desirable transactional behaviour such as fairness (Fehr and Schmidt, 2006) or trustworthiness (Fehrler and Przepiorka, 2013). A donor may also demonstrate attractiveness as a desirable receiver of joint profits, because either the partner is similar (Hamilton, 1964) or the partner supports similar charitable beneficiaries or behavioural codes.…”
Section: "Manage Decision Avoidance" [Relative To Its Alternatives]mentioning