Central monitoring deficiency and schizophrenic symptoms

Mlakar, Janez; Jensterle, J; Frith, Chris

doi:10.1017/s0033291700027719

Cited by 127 publications

(70 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…By contrast, the same patients had no difficulty making the correction when they were provided visual feedback on the displacement of the lever (e.g. Frith and Done, 1989;Mlakar et al, 1994). The problem with this type of experiment, however, is that it mostly stresses the automatic part of the action monitoring system, but tends to overlook the conscious part of this mechanism, that which makes it possible to give an explicit judgement on the action.…”

Section: Is There a Failure Of The Action Monitoring System In Schneimentioning

confidence: 99%

Agency, Simulation and Self‐identification

2004

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This paper is concerned with the problem of self-identification in the domain of action. We claim that this problem can arise not just for the self as object, but also for the self as subject in the ascription of agency. We discuss and evaluate some proposals concerning the mechanisms involved in self-identification and in agencyascription, and their possible impairments in pathological cases. We argue in favor of a simulation hypothesis that claims that actions, whether overt or covert, are centrally simulated by the neural network, and that this simulation provides the basis for action recognition and attribution.In this paper we will be concerned with the problem of self-identification as it arises in the domain of action, which we will take to include both overt and covert or simulated actions.Talk of a problem of identification presupposes a contrast set, and the possibility that, in seeking to identify one self, one picks out something in the contrast set instead. With self-identification, two contrast sets must be considered: the world at large and the set of other selves. The problem of self-identification therefore divides into two sub-problems: self-world discrimination and self-other discrimination. We focus here on the latter problem. Our first aim is to show that there is a problem of self-other discrimination. Our second aim is to discuss and evaluate some proposals concerning the mechanisms involved in self-identification and in agencyascription, and their possible impairments in pathological cases.In the first section, we will examine some of the reasons why philosophers have paid little attention to the problem of self-other discrimination, and investigate the conditions under which this problem can arise. In section 2, we will concentrate on the identification of the self as a physical body. In section 3, we will present evidence that we are able to perceive the intentions of others. This will involve the idea of shared representations of actions, the nature and format of which we willWe would like to thank Tim Bayne, Jérôme Dokic, Pierre Jacob, Joëlle Proust, Komarine Romdenh-Romluc, and the participants at the Workshop on Simulation held in Paris in May 2003 for discussions and comments on earlier versions of this paper. We are especially indebted to Gregory Currie for his penetrating and helpful comments and suggestions on multiple drafts of this paper.

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Section: Is There a Failure Of The Action Monitoring System In Schneimentioning

confidence: 99%

Agency, Simulation and Self‐identification

2004

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“…Di¤culty with such monitoring is suggested by failure to correct simple limb movement errors in the absence of visual feedback (Frith & Done 1989). In addition, patients have di¤culty remembering their own actions when these were carried out without visual feedback (Mlakar et al 1994). In both cases these results suggest that patients' knowledge about their own actions depends more on seeing what they have done rather than knowing in advance what they will do.…”

Section: (D) Hallucinations: Misperception Of Actionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Brain mechanisms associated with top-down processes in perception

Frith

Dolan

1997

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B

163

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Perception arises through an interaction between sensory input and prior knowledge. We propose that at least two brain areas are required for such an interaction: the`site' where analysis of a¡erent signals occurs and the`source' which applies the relevant prior knowledge. In the human brain, functional imaging studies have demonstrated that selective attention modi¢es activity in early visual processing areas speci¢c to the attended feature. Early processing areas are also modi¢ed when prior knowledge permits a percept to emerge from an otherwise meaningless stimulus. Sources of this modi¢cation have been identi¢ed in parietal cortex and in prefrontal cortex. Modi¢cation of early processing areas also occurs on the basis of prior knowledge about the predicted sensory e¡ects of the subject's own actions.Activity associated with mental imagery resembles that associated with response preparation (for motor imagery) and selective attention (for sensory imagery) suggesting that mental imagery re£ects the e¡ects of prior knowledge on sensory processing areas in the absence of sensory input. Damage to sensory processing areas can lead to a form of sensory hallucination which seems to arise from the interaction of prior knowledge with random sensory activity. In contrast, hallucinations associated with schizophrenia may arise from a failure of prior knowledge about motor intentions to modify activity in relevant sensory areas. When functioning normally, this mechanism permits us to distinguish our own actions from those of independent agents in the outside world. Failure to make this distinction correctly may account for the strong association between hallucinations and paranoid delusions in schizophrenia; the patient not only hears voices, but attributes (usually hostile) intentions to these voices.

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“…Mlakar et al [10] tested self-monitoring using a paradigm that involved the production and subsequent identification of drawings. The researchers argued that identification of drawings generated out-of-sight (without visual feedback) would make a heavy demand on self-monitoring, and they found that schizophrenic patients currently experiencing 'Schneiderian' symptoms made proportionately more such identification errors than non-symptomatic schizophrenic patients or non-patient controls.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Self-Monitoring Dysfunction and the Positive Symptoms of Schizophrenia

2001

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Frith has proposed that symptoms of alien control in schizophrenia result from a defect in a metarepresentational process leading to a failure to properly monitor self-willed intentions and actions. To examine this hypothesis, a group of 40 schizophrenic patients, all meeting DSM-III-R criteria, and rated for current symptoms on the basis of a detailed clinical interview, were compared with 36 non-patient controls, using a battery of tests which included measures of self-monitoring, general cognitive function and attention. In comparison with controls, patients were impaired on two tests of self-monitoring. These differences were preserved when measures of current IQ, attention, and recognition memory were entered as covariates. Amongst patients, self-monitoring performance was related to the severity and extent of positive symptoms. These findings provide further experimental support for the proposal that positive symptoms of schizophrenia arise as a result of deficiencies in self-monitoring.

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Central monitoring deficiency and schizophrenic symptoms

Cited by 127 publications

References 10 publications

Agency, Simulation and Self‐identification

Agency, Simulation and Self‐identification

Brain mechanisms associated with top-down processes in perception

Self-Monitoring Dysfunction and the Positive Symptoms of Schizophrenia

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