2012
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1942727
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CDS Auctions and Informative Biases in CDS Recovery Rates

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Cited by 18 publications
(21 citation statements)
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References 14 publications
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“…Their empirical evaluation, however, suggests that historically, bonds have on average been underpriced by 6%. This mirrors the findings in Gupta and Sundaram (2013), although the magnitude of the underpricing is significantly smaller.…”
Section: Cds Auctionssupporting
confidence: 83%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Their empirical evaluation, however, suggests that historically, bonds have on average been underpriced by 6%. This mirrors the findings in Gupta and Sundaram (2013), although the magnitude of the underpricing is significantly smaller.…”
Section: Cds Auctionssupporting
confidence: 83%
“…Three of these are empirical (Helwege et al (2009), Coudert andGex (2010), Gupta and Sundaram (2013)), while two other studies investigate the process from a theoretical perspective (Chernov and Makarov (2012), Du and Zhu (2013)). The most complete picture to date is probably given by Gupta and Sundaram (2013), who study a total of 76 auctions over the period [2008][2009][2010]. The authors conclude that the auction prices are significantly biased relative to the pre-and post-auction bond prices and that the underpricing is on average about 20%.…”
Section: Cds Auctionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Credit auctions will also enhance the information in bond markets as clarity about recovery values increases (Gupta and Sundaram (2012)). Recent global OTC derivative market reform, in particular the regulatory efforts in the US spearheaded by CFTC and SEC, recognize the important role of CDS markets vis-a-vis the bond markets and it remains to be seen how new regulations will impact the bond markets.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Exhibit 1, taken from Gupta and Sundaram [2012], illustrates using the CIT auction. For this purpose, all crossing and touching bids and offers (i.e., all bids b and offers o such that b ≥ o) are first eliminated from the submissions.…”
Section: The Auction Structurementioning
confidence: 99%
“…More generally, Gupta and Sundaram [2012] look at those auctions in which the deliverable bonds were traded actively both before and after the auction, and compare bond prices pre-and post-auction to those bond prices that resulted from the auction. For "sell" auctions (those with a second-stage NOI to sell), which constitute the vast majority of auctions in the data, they find that the auction systematically underprices the bonds relative to the market.…”
Section: The Performance Of the Auctionmentioning
confidence: 99%