Cartesian metaphysics and the role of the simple natures

Marion, Jean-Luc

doi:10.1017/ccol0521366232.005

Cited by 35 publications

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“…[t]he parallelism here is quite obvious: cognitio ("knowledge") in the Regulae becomes cogitatio ("thought") in the Second Meditation, with a further echo later in the list in the term intelligens ("thing [...] that understands"). Dubium ("doubt") becomes dubitans ("that doubts"); ignorantia ("ignorance") probably corresponds to affirmans/negans ("which affirms and denies"); voluntatis actio ("the action of the will") appears as the two modes of such action, volens/ nolens (is willing, is unwilling) ( [14], p. 126). This comparison between the simples natures and the properties of the cogito allows Marion to draw the seemingly undeniable conclusion that "[t]he essence of the res cogitans is defined in terms identical to the list of intellectual simple natures" ( [14], p. 127).…”

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“…Dubium ("doubt") becomes dubitans ("that doubts"); ignorantia ("ignorance") probably corresponds to affirmans/negans ("which affirms and denies"); voluntatis actio ("the action of the will") appears as the two modes of such action, volens/ nolens (is willing, is unwilling) ( [14], p. 126). This comparison between the simples natures and the properties of the cogito allows Marion to draw the seemingly undeniable conclusion that "[t]he essence of the res cogitans is defined in terms identical to the list of intellectual simple natures" ( [14], p. 127). In other words, the cognitive notions that Descartes employed in the Rules to analyze human perceptual experience are used in the Meditations for the purpose of shaping the notion of cogito.…”

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“…For in Marion's assessment, "[w]ith the doctrine of the simple natures, the Regulae is already equipped with all the elements required for articulating the first proposition of metaphysics" ( [13], p. 119). It is on these grounds that he claims that "the transition to metaphysics depends not on any new elements or concepts, but merely on the necessity which links them [the simple natures] together -and this necessity depends in turn on order" ( [14], p. 119). This privileged condition for converting the simple natures into the cogito will only be found in the Meditations, where for the first time Descartes makes use of the 'order of reasons'.…”

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“…The result of this process of linkage the simple natures in the right order would have led Descartes, already in the Rules, to find out the first metaphysical truth, i. e., the cogito. That is why Marion claims that "[...] the Regulae contains the elements of metaphysics (the intellectual simple natures) but not their ordering (their necessary lining with the common simple natures) [...]" ( [14], p. 119). Therefore, in order to shape the notion of the cogito Descartes does not need anything else except to put the simple natures it consist of in the adequate order: "to think/to doubt" and "to exist".…”

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On the Role and Function of Augustine’s Inwardness in the Constitution of Descartes’ Cogito

Teixeira¹

2020

PhIJ

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The main aim of this paper is to show how ' Augustinian inwardness' has played a decisive role in the constitution of Descartes' cogito. So I will first hold that Descartes has borrowed this inward feature of Augustine's thought and developed from it a method of introspection which is widely used in his Meditations on first philosophy. Next, I will show that it will be by subordinating the simple natures to the subject of inherence issued from the mind-body distinction undertaken under the influence of Augustinian inwardness that Descartes will shape the metaphysical notion of res cogitans (thinking substance).In the end, it will be clear that Augustine' inwardness helps us understand not only how 'thought' was raised to the ontological role it plays in Descartes' metaphysics, but also why it has ontological priority among the other intellectual simple natures.

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On the Role and Function of Augustine’s Inwardness in the Constitution of Descartes’ Cogito

Teixeira¹

2020

PhIJ

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“…143-144). For discussion see Raftopoulos (2003); Gaukroger (2005); Garber (1993); Marion (1992). 20 David Hume ([1748, Hume (1739, pp.…”

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Newtonian Explanatory Reduction and Hume’s System of the Sciences

Hazony¹

2014

Newton and Empiricism

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138 140 Newton and "Empiricist" Philosophers experience. So a "system of the sciences" must, for him, be empirical. But what is an empirical "system of the sciences"? I argue that (ii) by the time Hume wrote the Treatise, English natural philosophy had indeed developed the tools for the construction of a hierarchical system of sciences derived empirically. The key to the construction of an empirical hierarchy of the sciences is provided by Boyle's conception of a step-wise "reduction" or "resolution" of the respective sciences to a small set of fundamental terms derived from physics. 7 Such explanatory reduction then appears in a new and much more powerful form in Newton's Principia. Finally, I show that (iii) Hume consistently presents his method in terms almost identical to those Newton uses to describe his own explanatory reductions. 8 Hume differs from Newton in claiming that all of experience can be reduced to psychological "elements" that he takes to be simpler and more general than those provided by physics. 9 6.1 WHAT IS A 'SYSTEM OF THE SCIENCES'? What does Hume mean when he speaks of a "system of the sciences"? We know from the Introduction to the Treatise that he conceives of all of the sciences as being interrelated-and, more specifically, that this interrelationship derives from the fact that all of the sciences are "dependent" on the study of human nature. As he writes: 'Tis evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature.. .. Even Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in for 'deduce': "to draw in a regular connected series, from one time to another. " See Baier (1991, p. 302, n. 8). 7 I will be using the term "reduction" to mean something rather different from what it is usually taken to mean in recent philosophy. I discuss this term and its meaning in the context of early modern philosophy in Section 2 below. 8 But Hume is not to be taken as a straightforward Newtonian. Hume in fact has a dual agenda with respect to Newton. On the one hand, Hume's aims and methods in the Treatise are strongly influenced by Newton. On the other hand, Hume's Treatise is deeply subversive with respect to Newtonianism. The subversive character of the Hume's philosophy with respect to Newton is a theme that has been raised in past work by Noxon (1973), Jones (1982), and Barfoot (1990, pp. 151-190). However, these works fail to recognize the profoundly Newtonian character of Hume's work. More balanced works that treat the anti-Newtonian aspects of Hume's philosophy alongside recognition of Newton'

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Baldassarri

2023

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

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Cartesian metaphysics and the role of the simple natures

Cited by 35 publications

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On the Role and Function of Augustine’s Inwardness in the Constitution of Descartes’ Cogito

On the Role and Function of Augustine’s Inwardness in the Constitution of Descartes’ Cogito

Newtonian Explanatory Reduction and Hume’s System of the Sciences

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