Caring for the future can turn tragedy into comedy for long-term collective action under risk of collapse

Abstract

We will need collective action to avoid catastrophic climate change, and this will require valuing the long term as well as the short term. Shortsightedness and uncertainty have hindered progress in resolving this collective action problem and have been recognized as important barriers to cooperation among humans. Here, we propose a coupled social–ecological dilemma to investigate the interdependence of three well-identified components of this cooperation problem: 1) timescales of collapse and recovery in relation to time preferences regarding future outcomes, 2) the magnitude of the impact of collapse, and 3) the number of actors in the collective. We find that, under a sufficiently severe and time-distant collapse, how much the actors care for the future can transform the game from a tragedy of the commons into one of coordination, and even into a comedy of the commons in which cooperation dominates. Conversely, we also find conditions under which even strong concern for the future still does not transform the problem from tragedy to comedy. For a large number of participating actors, we find that the critical collapse impact, at which these game regime changes happen, converges to a fixed value of collapse impact per actor that is independent of the enhancement factor of the public good, which is usually regarded as the driver of the dilemma. Our results not only call for experimental testing but also help explain why polarization in beliefs about human-caused climate change can threaten global cooperation agreements.

Timing Uncertainty in Collective Risk Dilemmas Encourages Group Reciprocation and Polarization

“…This effect may be potentially reinforced when combined with communication, institutions, or costly commitments ( Han et al., 2017 ; Smead et al., 2014 ; Tavoni et al., 2011 ; Vasconcelos et al., 2013 , 2015 ). The implications of these observations within the framing of real-world CRDs in health ( Brewer et al., 2007 ; Ferguson, 2007 ; Perisic and Bauch, 2009 ; Van Segbroeck et al, 2010 ; Westhoff et al., 2012 ) and socio-political processes ( Abou Chakra and Traulsen, 2012 ; Barfuss et al., 2020 ; Barrett, 2016 ; Barrett and Dannenberg, 2012 ; Santos et al., 2012 ; Vasconcelos et al., 2013 , 2015 ), as mentioned above, may vary depending on the specific problem. We may nonetheless highlight that, in light of our results, uncertainty on, e.g., the urgency of reducing CO 2 emissions or the risk of a pandemic, may trigger reciprocal behaviors and further reinforce polarization, with potential detrimental impacts that can be hardly overemphasized.…”

“…The game-theoretical model we employ relies on population dynamics and social learning ( Sigmund, 2010 ) and is capable of capturing the conditions in which timing uncertainty induces a shift toward reciprocal behaviors and polarization. However, this is one among many approaches that could be used (see, e.g., Barfuss et al., 2020 ; 2017 ; Bloembergen et al., 2015 , for alternatives). Having multiple models based on different assumptions confirming the same observations can only strengthen the results and improve our understanding of these complex self-organizing phenomena.…”

“…Rational selfish behavior stipulates that it is best to not contribute; yet such decision would be detrimental, as a group is better off when all contribute. These games not only serve as a good model for social public benefits (e.g., social security, retirement funds) but are also recurrent in many other collective endeavors, from group hunting ( Hill, 2002 ; Kaplan et al., 2000 ) to public health ( Brewer et al., 2007 ; Ferguson, 2007 ; Perisic and Bauch, 2009 ; Van Segbroeck et al, 2010 ; Westhoff et al., 2012 ) and socio-political processes like climate change ( Abou Chakra and Traulsen, 2012 ; Barfuss et al., 2020 ; Barrett, 2016 ; Barrett and Dannenberg, 2012 ; Santos et al., 2012 ; Vasconcelos et al., 2013 , 2015 ).…”

Learning enables adaptation in cooperation for multi-player stochastic games

“…the state of the PGG). This case is especially likely after some prosocial behaviours have been implemented by players [21,29,58]. As such, the population will spend some time staying in the states where defection is not always favourable (e.g.…”

A collective risk dilemma for tourism restrictions under the COVID-19 context

“…Other interesting factors analyzed in the previous literature are the role of migration 30 and the timing of the contribution of every participant 31 . Recently, the classical CRD model framework has been extended by defining two environmental states (prosperous and degraded) which evolve and interact to each other 32 . The general results agree with previous findings and extend them by analyzing the effect of time preferences and magnitude of collapse.…”