Can’t We All Disagree More Constructively? Moral Foundations, Moral Reasoning, and Political Disagreement

Sauer, Hanno

doi:10.1007/s12152-015-9235-6

Cited by 20 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 34 publications

(53 reference statements)

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Section: Realism and Moral Political Philosophy On Secessionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Therefore, the effects of moralising a disagreement on the right to secede instead of fostering more stability and order (a very liberal and realist concern) promote moral entrenchment and social division. Empirical research has consistently found that deepening the moral foundations of political disagreements makes political debates harder to develop (Sauer ; Valentini ).We also know the potential violence associated with secession conflicts (Coggins ; Sorens ). Territorial demands are at the heart of an important number of civil wars around the world, and it is not necessary to restate just how explosive these conflicts tend to be (Toft ).…”

Section: Realism and Moral Political Philosophy On Secessionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Moralism in theories of secession: a realist perspective

Sanjaume‐Calvet

2019

Nations and Nationalism

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Moral reasoning is the most common approach to secession in political philosophy. Just‐cause, choice and liberal‐cultural theories rely on moral conceptions of political authority. This article examines an alternative view through an exploration of moral theories of secession from a realist perspective. Realism has recently seen a revival as a form of normative political philosophy and focuses on political disagreement and legitimacy rather than rights and moral analysis. I claim that realism would reject utopianism and moralism present in theories of secession. Instead of regarding secession as a right, realism would frame secession as a political option. According to this view, this article explores a realist theory of secession that would be based on the priority of politics and disagreement among other concepts. This would be a middle‐ground theory, compatible with liberal values and existing moral theories.

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Section: Realism and Moral Political Philosophy On Secessionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Realism and Moral Political Philosophy On Secessionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moralism in theories of secession: a realist perspective

Sanjaume‐Calvet

2019

Nations and Nationalism

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“…Virtually everyone is at least somewhat sensitive to the moral relevance of all six foundations, even though different people – and, in particular, different political groups – assign more (or less) importance to different foundations. Liberals famously emphasize the first two foundations at the expense of the others; conservatives have a more balanced appreciation of all six foundations (Sauer, ). This, however, does not support moral relativism; it merely explains why there are differences between basic political outlooks such as liberalism and conservatism.…”

Section: Evidence For Agreementmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Liberals famously emphasize the first two foundations at the expense of the others; conservatives have a more balanced appreciation of all six foundations (Sauer, 2015). This, however, does not support moral relativism; it merely explains why there are differences between basic political outlooks such as liberalism and conservatism.…”

Section: Liberty/oppression 12mentioning

confidence: 99%

The argument from agreement: How universal values undermine moral realism

Sauer

2019

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The most popular argument against moral realism is the argument from disagreement: if there are mind‐independent moral facts, then we would not expect to find as much moral disagreement as we in fact do; therefore, moral realism is false. In this paper, I develop the flipside of this argument. According to this argument from agreement, we would expect to find lots of moral disagreement if there were mind‐independent moral facts. But we do not, in fact, find much moral disagreement; therefore, moral realism is false. I defend the argument, explain the empirical evidence that supports it, and show what makes this challenge novel and powerful.

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“…Moral judgment, it now seemed, is not just largely intuitive, but which intuitions people have is due to differences in their moral foundations , with important political consequences (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009;Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012;cf. Curry, 2016, Sauer, 2015.…”

Section: The Anti-rationalist Turnmentioning

confidence: 99%

The psychology and rationality of moral judgment

Wiegmann¹,

Sauer²

2019

Preprint

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The field of moral psychology has become increasingly popular in recent years. In this chapter, we focus on two interrelated questions. First, how do peoplemake moral judgments? We address this question by reviewing the most prominent theories in moral psychology that aim to characterize, explain and predict people’s moral judgments. Second, how should people’s moral judgments be evaluated in terms of their rationality? This question is approached by reviewing the debate on the rationality of moral judgments and moral intuitions, which has been strongly influenced by findings in moral psychology but also by recent advances in learning theory. To appear in: Knauff, M. & Spohn, W. (in press). The Handbook of Rationality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

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Can’t We All Disagree More Constructively? Moral Foundations, Moral Reasoning, and Political Disagreement

Abstract: Can't we all disagree more constructively?

Cited by 20 publications

References 34 publications

Moralism in theories of secession: a realist perspective

Moralism in theories of secession: a realist perspective

The argument from agreement: How universal values undermine moral realism

The psychology and rationality of moral judgment

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