Bureaucratic Structure and Compliance with International Agreements

Abstract

Why do some states comply with international agreements while others flout them? In this article, I introduce a previously unconsidered explanation: bureaucratic structure. I develop a rational choice model examining the impact of bureaucratic structure on compliance, suggesting that the existence of several distinct bureaucracies can mute compliance with an international agreement by insulating some bureaucrats from pressure to comply. I examine this theory through newly coded data on a 2001 OECD agreement designed to decrease the percentage of aid that is “tied” to donor‐state products and services—a practice that is popular among special interests but which decreases foreign aid's effectiveness. I find that non–development‐oriented bureaucracies, such as departments of interior, labor, and energy, were significantly less likely to comply with the agreement than traditional development bureaucracies. This aggregates to the state level as well, where states with many aid agencies were less compliant than states with a streamlined bureaucracy.

Aggressive Police Leaders and the Strategic Choice of Overpolicing

“…It also suggests that effective reforms should address both systemic changes and the selection and development of leaders, making leader selection a key priority in curbing unethical behavior in bureaucracies. These theoretical propositions and empirical tests are of value to a burgeoning literature on individual and systemic causes of bureaucratic outcomes (Ba et al 2023;Carcelli 2023;Emeriau 2023;Mummolo 2018;Toral 2023). This paper underscores the significance of collecting comprehensive individual-level data concerning state agents, enabling a deeper examination of their impact on organizational results.…”

“…The theoretical propositions and empirical findings in this study act as a bridge connecting the literatures on individual and systemic factors influencing bureaucracies (Ba et al 2023;Carcelli 2023;Emeriau 2023;Mummolo 2018;Toral 2023). This research reveals that both systemic and individual factors are crucial, exemplified by the joint impact of commanding officers and reforms on policing practices.…”

Bureaucracy at the Border: The Fragmentation of United States Foreign Aid

“…In contrast, the literature on the consequences of aid fragmentation is robust. Carcelli (2023b); Oh and Kim (2014); Kilby (2011); Aldasoro et al (2010); Annen and Kosempel (2009); Djankov et al (2009); Knack and Rahman (2007); and Acharya et al (2006) find that aid recipients receiving large numbers of small projects benefit less from aid. Policy advocates agree (OECD 2009; Ford 2007), and many rankings of foreign aid effectiveness explicitly consider “fragmentation across donor agencies” (e.g.…”