Building the Leviathan – Voluntary centralisation of punishment power sustains cooperation in humans

Gross, Jörg; Méder, Zsombor Z.; Okamoto-Barth, Sanae; Riedl, Arno

doi:10.1038/srep20767

Cited by 55 publications

(61 citation statements)

References 61 publications

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“…Empirically investigating the natural rise of governance could be regarded as investigating the creation of a leviathan29 in a laboratory. Recently, some research experimentally investigates how leviathans are built3031. This is an ambitious aim, and our idea is an important approach to investigate this topic.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Solving the second-order free rider problem in a public goods game: An experiment using a leader support system

Ozono

Jin

Watabe

et al. 2016

Sci Rep

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Punishment of non-cooperators—free riders—can lead to high cooperation in public goods games (PGG). However, second-order free riders, who do not pay punishment costs, reduce the effectiveness of punishment. Here we introduce a “leader support system,” in which one group leader can freely punish group followers using capital pooled through the support of group followers. In our experiment, participants engage in three stages repeatedly: a PGG stage in which followers decide to cooperate for their group; a support stage in which followers decide whether to support the leader; and a punishment stage in which the leader can punish any follower. We compare a support-present condition with a no-support condition, in which there is an external source for the leader’s punishment. The results show that punishment occurs more frequently in the support-present condition than the no-support condition. Within the former, both higher cooperation and higher support for a leader are achieved under linkage-type leaders—who punish both non-cooperators and non-supporters. In addition, linkage-type leaders themselves earn higher profits than other leader types because they withdraw more support. This means that leaders who effectively punish followers could increase their own benefits and the second-order free rider problem would be solved.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Solving the second-order free rider problem in a public goods game: An experiment using a leader support system

Ozono

Jin

Watabe

et al. 2016

Sci Rep

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show abstract

“…Individuals, after they see their group members' contributions, can execute a punishment that is costly to themselves, but more costly to the punished group member or members (13,19,(36)(37)(38)(39). Experiments have shown that individuals punish to motivate others to contribute more and that individuals respond to (the threat of) punishment by increasing subsequent contributions in public good provision (36)(37)(38)(39) and intergroup contests (13,18,19). Accordingly, Exp.…”

Section: Methods Summarymentioning

confidence: 99%

In-group defense, out-group aggression, and coordination failures in intergroup conflict

Dreu

Gross

Méder

et al. 2016

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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120

144

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Intergroup conflict persists when and because individuals make costly contributions to their group's fighting capacity, but how groups organize contributions into effective collective action remains poorly understood. Here we distinguish between contributions aimed at subordinating out-groups (out-group aggression) from those aimed at defending the in-group against possible out-group aggression (in-group defense). We conducted two experiments in which three-person aggressor groups confronted three-person defender groups in a multiround contest game (n = 276; 92 aggressor-defender contests). Individuals received an endowment from which they could contribute to their group's fighting capacity. Contributions were always wasted, but when the aggressor group's fighting capacity exceeded that of the defender group, the aggressor group acquired the defender group's remaining resources (otherwise, individuals on both sides were left with the remainders of their endowment). In-group defense appeared stronger and better coordinated than out-group aggression, and defender groups survived roughly 70% of the attacks. This low success rate for aggressor groups mirrored that of group-hunting predators such as wolves and chimpanzees (n = 1,382 cases), hostile takeovers in industry (n = 1,637 cases), and interstate conflicts (n = 2,586). Furthermore, whereas peer punishment increased out-group aggression more than in-group defense without affecting success rates (Exp. 1), sequential (vs. simultaneous) decision-making increased coordination of collective action for out-group aggression, doubling the aggressor's success rate (Exp. 2). The relatively high success rate of in-group defense suggests evolutionary and cultural pressures may have favored capacities for cooperation and coordination when the group goal is to defend, rather than to expand, dominate, and exploit.competition | parochial altruism | coordination | collective action | intergroup relations

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“…If, as we argue, HS is a prerequisite for punishment, then HS individuals potentially have access to an additional benefit, maintaining their HS position. Individuals prefer an environment where ''someone'' can punish (Gürerk, Irlenbusch, & Rockenbach, 2006) and will transfer power to individuals who are willing to punish noncooperation (Gross, Méder, Okamoto-Barth, & Riedl, 2016). Yet the benefits of HS, for example, a greater say in-group decision making, are often dependent on continuing to be a good social partner (von Rueden, Gurven, & Kaplan, 2008).…”

Section: Current Studies: Status and Observer Opinions Of Punishersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Who Punishes? The Status of the Punishers Affects the Perceived Success of, and Indirect Benefits From, “Moralistic” Punishment

Gordon

Lea

2016

Evol Psychol

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''Moralistic'' punishment of free riders can provide a beneficial reputation, but the immediate behavior is costly to the punisher. In Study 1, we investigated whether variation in status would be perceived to offset or mitigate the costs of punishment. One hundred and nineteen participants were presented with a vignette describing a punishment scenario. Participants predicted whether punishment would occur, how successful it would be, and indicated their attitude to the punisher. Participants believed only intervention by a high-status (HS) individual would be successful and that low-status (LS) individuals would not intervene at all. HS individuals predicted to punish successfully were seen as more formidable and likable. Study 2 investigated whether punishment was necessary to maintain an HS position. One hundred and seventeen participants were presented with a vignette describing a punishment scenario. Participants were asked to indicate whether they wished to be led by the punisher. HS individuals who did not punish were less likely to be chosen as leaders compared to HS punishers, whereas LS individuals who punished were no more or less likely to be chosen than nonpunishers. The results of both studies suggest that only HS individuals are expected to punish, likely because such a position offsets some of the costs of punishment. As a result, only HS individual can access the reputation benefits from punishment. Furthermore, an HS position may be dependent on the willingness to punish antisocial behavior. The ramifications that these results may have for the evolution of moralistic punishment are discussed.

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Building the Leviathan – Voluntary centralisation of punishment power sustains cooperation in humans

Cited by 55 publications

References 61 publications

Solving the second-order free rider problem in a public goods game: An experiment using a leader support system

Solving the second-order free rider problem in a public goods game: An experiment using a leader support system

In-group defense, out-group aggression, and coordination failures in intergroup conflict

Who Punishes? The Status of the Punishers Affects the Perceived Success of, and Indirect Benefits From, “Moralistic” Punishment

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