British Factory, Japanese Factory and Mexican Factory: An International Comparison of Front‐Line Management and Supervision

Abstract

This paper presents a case study of a Japanese-owned electronics firm, presenting a comparative analysis of the company's supervisory systems in three of its plants located in different countries -Japan, Mexico and Britain. Comparative analysis is enabled through use of the concept of a supervisory system of control, which allows us to match the relative positions of managers, supervisors and workers across the three sites. The case study data enables us systematically to examine questions of the transferability of a Japanese supervisory system -a central component of Japanese manufacturing -outside of Japan. The results suggest that 'Japanese' supervisory systems have been established with more success in Mexico than in Britain, and the main factors that explain this are varying local labour market conditions, limits to managerial control on the shopfloor, the relationship between the product market and the organization of production, and local and expatriate management commitment to a Japanese system. There is an extensive literature on Japanese management and work organization and its transfer abroad (Abo

Management control in multinational companies: a systematic literature review

“…CEOs with longer tenure are controlled less by the subsidiary's board of directors (Du et al 2015). Managerial commitment seems to facilitate the implementation of corporate culture (Lowe et al 2000). Incentives of senior managers increase with higher commitment, but corporate performance gains weight with lower commitment (Roth and O'Donnell 1996).…”

“…At subsidiaries in competitive markets, PMS has higher influence on subsidiary decisions (Dossi and Patelli 2008) and diverse measurement perspectives including non-financial indicators become increasingly important (Dossi and Patelli 2008;Hoque and Chia 2012;Kihn 2008). Markets that necessitate high product diversity challenge production as well as supervisory systems and increase the complexity of MC (Lowe et al 2000). Adapting products and services to local market requirements demands a certain autonomy and seems incompatible with tight control and culture transfer from headquarters (Lin 2014).…”

“…Political influence is not a phenomenon limited to emerging countries, however; a case in Europe illustrates that political influence in form of subsidies provided by the state and the EU for an otherwise unprofitable subsidiary led to unrealistic budgeting processes (Fernandez-Revuelta Perez and Robson 1999). Strong influence of trade unions in the UK demands that MC needs to comply with agreed procedures (Lowe et al 2000). In addition, the deregulation of industries creates the demand to implement PMS in previously protected sectors (Masquefa 2008).…”

“…High wages in European countries require strategic investments to secure competitive advantages through innovation (Carr and Tomkins 1996) or encourage foreign MNCs to search for alternatives in form of short-term contracts, that require tight control (Chang et al 2009). A well-trained workforce facilitates the implementation of supervisory systems (Lowe et al 2000), the launch of management information systems (Sheu et al 2004) and simplifies the alignment of a foreign subsidiary with Western corporate culture (Moilanen 2007). A lack of skilled workforce delays training programs and may result in having to outsource tasks (Sheu et al 2004).…”

Competitive Strategy and Performance in Mexico, Peru, and the United States

“…Class distinction is widely accepted, as is the great difference in the distribution of wealth and power within organizations. Influence from the United States notwithstanding, there is evidence that Mexican managers employ substantially different reasoning processes from their American counterparts (Husted, Dozier, McMahon, & Kattan, 1996;Lowe, Morris & Wilkinson, 2000). Overall, the Mexican culture is cohesive, one that emphasizes the role of the family.…”