2011
DOI: 10.1007/s10997-011-9181-6
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Board of directors and insider trading with share repurchase programs

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Cited by 9 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…For instance, Muller-Kahle et al (2011) show that financial service companies that chose to specialize in subprime lending and, and as a result, were negatively affected by subprime loan defaults had board members with less tenure, as compared to "smart" firms that avoided these risky business practices. Howton (2006) finds that firms with longer tenure boards are more likely to survive after an IPO vs. firms that fail or are acquired, and Hamouda et al (2013) show that more seasoned boards are more likely to curb predatory insider trading practices around share repurchase announcements.…”
Section: Prior Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
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“…For instance, Muller-Kahle et al (2011) show that financial service companies that chose to specialize in subprime lending and, and as a result, were negatively affected by subprime loan defaults had board members with less tenure, as compared to "smart" firms that avoided these risky business practices. Howton (2006) finds that firms with longer tenure boards are more likely to survive after an IPO vs. firms that fail or are acquired, and Hamouda et al (2013) show that more seasoned boards are more likely to curb predatory insider trading practices around share repurchase announcements.…”
Section: Prior Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…other hand, a different stream of literature finds that board tenure is improving board's functionality, as longer-tenured board members are less susceptible to pressure by managers (Beasley 1996, Schnake et al 2005, are more knowledgeable about company operations (Rutherford 2007), and are more likely to curb opportunistic behavior by managers (Hamouda et al 2013 andDou et al 2015). One potential reason for the inconsistent empirical findings may be related to the small samples used by these studies.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…Some studies find that longer board tenure is detrimental to firm value, as it leads to the decrease of board independence (Vafeas 2003), governance problems (Berberich 2011), and lack of critical thinking by board members (Coles et al 2015). On the other hand, a different stream of literature finds that board tenure is improving board's functionality, as longer-tenured board members are less susceptible to pressure by managers (Beasley 1996, Schnake et al 2005, are more knowledgeable about company operations (Rutherford 2007), and are more likely to curb opportunistic behavior by managers (Hamouda et al 2013 andDou et al 2015). One potential reason for the inconsistent empirical findings may be related to the small samples used by these studies.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…Share repurchase programs have become an important pay-out policy in developed countries over the past twenty years, especially the US (Hamouda and Ben Arab, 2011). Globally, a share buy-back, as a popular instrument for firms to distribute money, is a program by which a firm utilizes excess cash to repurchase its own shares.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%