Basic Self‐Awareness

Billon, Alexandre

doi:10.1111/ejop.12168

Cited by 21 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 45 publications

(73 reference statements)

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“…(2) Second, the "pain" is experienced as non-genuine, or fake, as if something is lacking that would make it truly real. Arguably, what is missing is the subjective first-personal sense of "mineness" (see Billon, 2017) which gives an affective colour to one's experiences. 3Finally, there appears to be a 'divorce' or split in the subjective character of the patient's experience: the self and body seem to be experienced not from a first-but from a third person, objectifying perspective.…”

Section: 'Living In a Bubble': Opacity And Self-objectification In Dementioning

confidence: 99%

When the Window Cracks: Transparency and the Fractured Self in Depersonalisation

Ciaunica

Charlton²,

Farmer

2020

Phenom Cogn Sci

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There has recently been a resurgence of philosophical and scientific interest in the foundations of self-consciousness, with particular focus on its altered, anomalous forms. This paper looks at the altered forms of self-awareness in Depersonalization Disorder (DPD), a condition in which people feel detached from their self, their body and the world (Derealisation). Building upon the phenomenological distinction between reflective and pre-reflective self-consciousness, we argue that DPD may alter the transparency of basic embodied forms of pre-reflective self-consciousness, as well as the capacity to flexibly modulate and switch between the reflective and pre-reflective facets of self-awareness. Empirical evidence will be invoked in support of the idea that impaired processing of bodily signals is characteristic of the condition. We provide first-hand subjective reports describing the experience of self-detachment or fracture between an observing and an observed self. This split is compared with similar selfdetachment phenomena reported in certain Buddhist-derived meditative practices. We suggest that these alterations and changes may reveal the underlying and tacit transparency that characterises the embodied and basic pre-reflective forms of self-consciousness, in the same way that a crack in a transparent glass may indicate the presence of an unnoticed window.

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Section: 'Living In a Bubble': Opacity And Self-objectification In Dementioning

confidence: 99%

When the Window Cracks: Transparency and the Fractured Self in Depersonalisation

Ciaunica

Charlton²,

Farmer

2020

Phenom Cogn Sci

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“…I study the connection between the lack of subjective character and the mentioned impairment of ‘self‐awareness’, as well as its implications for the nature of self‐awareness, in much detail elsewhere (Billon, ).…”

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confidence: 99%

Making Sense of the Cotard Syndrome: Insights from the Study of Depersonalisation

Billon

2016

Mind & Language

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Patients suffering from the Cotard syndrome can deny being alive, having guts, thinking or even existing. They can also complain that the world or time have ceased to exist. In this paper, I argue that even though the leading neurocognitive accounts have difficulties meeting that task, we should, and we can, make sense of these bizarre delusions. To that effect, I draw on the close connection between the Cotard syndrome and a more common (and better studied) condition known as depersonalisation. Even though they are not delusional, depersonalised patients seem to have experiences that are quite similar to those of Cotard patients. I argue that these experiences are essentially characterised by a (more or less important) lack of subjective character and of two other structural features of experience, which I call 'the present character' and 'the actual character.' Cotard's nihilistic delusions simply consist in taking these anomalous experiences at face value.

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“…4), Fumerton (1995, p. 75), Hasan (2013b), Moser (1989), and Pryor (2005). 52 For recent defense of the view that we are acquainted with ourselves, see Billon (2017), Duncan (2015Duncan ( , 2018a, Kripke (2011), and Strawson (2017). For recent defense of the view that experiences bear the acquaintance relation to themselves, see Williford (2015Williford ( , 2019 and Zahavi (2006).…”

Section: Endnotesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Acquaintance

Duncan

2021

Philosophy Compass

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To be acquainted with something (in the philosophical sense of "acquainted" discussed here) is to be directly aware of it. The idea that we are acquainted with certain things we experience has been discussed throughout the history of Western Philosophy, but in the early 20th century it gained especially focused attention among analytic philosophers who drew their inspiration from Bertrand Russell's work on acquaintance. Since then, many philosophers-particularly those working on self-knowledge or perception-have used the notion of acquaintance to explain various facts about human experience and knowledge. In this paper, I offer an overview of this work, with particular focus on the resurgent literature on acquaintance in contemporary analytic philosophy. After more fully explaining what acquaintance is (or is supposed to be), I describe some reasons for thinking that we are indeed acquainted with certain things we experience, and then I survey some of the facts about experience and knowledge that acquaintance may help explain. 1 | INTRODUCTION This paper is about acquaintance-an especially direct mental relation that we (allegedly) bear to certain things we experience, such as colors, smells, tastes, pains, and itches. This philosophical notion has received renewed interest and use of late, but it has also invited misunderstanding and skepticism. My aim in this paper is to dispel some of that misunderstanding and, hopefully, some of the skepticism too. Most contemporary philosophers who appeal to acquaintance draw their inspiration from Bertrand Russell (1911, 1912), who characterizes acquaintance as direct awareness. This differs from the ordinary sense of "acquaintance," as in "Hector and Paula are acquaintances" (or related knowledge attributions, such as "Hector knows Paula"). For one may be acquainted with something in that sense without being directly aware of it.

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Basic Self‐Awareness

Cited by 21 publications

References 45 publications

When the Window Cracks: Transparency and the Fractured Self in Depersonalisation

When the Window Cracks: Transparency and the Fractured Self in Depersonalisation

Making Sense of the Cotard Syndrome: Insights from the Study of Depersonalisation

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