Automated Proofs for Asymmetric Encryption

Courant, Judicaël; Daubignard, Marion; Ene, Cristian; Lafourcade, Pascal; Lakhnech, Yassine

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-11512-7_19

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Other computationally sound logics include CIL (Computational Indistinguishability Logic) [30] and a specialized Hoare logic designed for proving asymmetric encryption schemes in the random oracle model [95,96].…”

Section: Adapting Techniques From the Symbolic Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Security Protocol Verification: Symbolic and Computational Models

Blanchet

2012

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Section: Adapting Techniques From the Symbolic Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Security Protocol Verification: Symbolic and Computational Models

Blanchet

2012

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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“…Courant [6] presented a method to automatically prove the IND-CCA2 security of encryption schemes in random oracle model and proved the security of BR93 encryption scheme. The proof is described by Hoare logic and proceeds in two steps.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Framework for Automatic Security Proof of Public-Key Cryptography in Computational Model

Fei

et al. 2012

2012 Fourth International Conference on Multimedia Information Networking and Security

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In this paper we present a new framework for automatically proving the security of public-key cryptographic schemes in computational model. The framework uses the sequence-of-games approach to construct security proof. A probabilistic polynomial-time process calculus is designed to describe the attack games and the game transformations are executed with the help of observational equivalence. The framework has been implemented as a automated prover tested on a series of examples, including encryption and signature schemes. As an example, we illustrate the use of our framework with the proof of IND-CPA security of ElGamal encryption.

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“…It can prove secrecy and integrity properties. In another line of research, a specialized Hoare logic was designed for proving asymmetric encryption schemes in the random oracle model [39,40].…”

Section: Inria 1 Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Composition Theorems for CryptoVerif and Application to TLS 1.3

Blanchet

2018

2018 IEEE 31st Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)

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We present composition theorems for security protocols, to compose a key exchange protocol and a symmetric-key protocol that uses the exchanged key. Our results rely on the computational model of cryptography and are stated in the framework of the tool CryptoVerif. They support key exchange protocols that guarantee injective or non-injective authentication. They also allow random oracles shared between the composed protocols. To our knowledge, they are the first composition theorems for key exchange stated for a computational protocol verification tool, and also the first to allow such flexibility. As a case study, we apply our composition theorems to a proof of TLS 1.3 Draft-18. This work fills a gap in a previous paper that informally claims a compositional proof of TLS 1.3, without formally justifying it.

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Automated Proofs for Asymmetric Encryption

Cited by 4 publications

References 22 publications

Security Protocol Verification: Symbolic and Computational Models

Security Protocol Verification: Symbolic and Computational Models

A Framework for Automatic Security Proof of Public-Key Cryptography in Computational Model

Composition Theorems for CryptoVerif and Application to TLS 1.3

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