Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats

Gandhi, Jennifer; Przeworski, Adam

doi:10.1177/0010414007305817

Cited by 996 publications

(559 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…13 To complete the recursive bivariate probit model, we need a model of the incumbent's decision to hold multiparty elections. For this, we turn to Gandhi's work on political institutions under authoritarianism (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007;Gandhi 2008). In her framework, dictators accede to multipartyism for three primary reasons.…”

Section: Estimated Effects Of Endogenous Multiparty Elections On Civimentioning

confidence: 99%

“…First, we have a different dependent variable. In the study by Gandhi and Przeworski (2007), the dependent variable is the number of legislative parties and in the study by Gandhi (2008), it is a set of ordered categories that describe increasing levels of institutionalization under dictatorship. The highest category is for dictatorships with multiparty legislatures.…”

Section: Estimated Effects Of Endogenous Multiparty Elections On Civimentioning

confidence: 99%

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Elections and Civil War in Africa

Cheibub¹,

Hays²

2015

PSRM

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The view that multiparty elections in changing authoritarian regimes should be held sooner rather than later has been increasingly under attack. Critics argue that, under conditions of low institutional development, multiparty elections may lead to violence and civil war, rather than to the peaceful allocation of authority that everyone desires. Starting from the premise that elections are strategically timed and endogenous in transitioning authoritarian regimes, that is, more likely to be held when violence is imminent, we show that for Africa, the continent with the lowest levels of political institutionalization, elections do not increase the probability of a civil war initiation. In fact, for the post-Cold War period, the holding of multiparty elections is actually associated with a substantial reduction in the probability of civil war onset. To account for this pattern, we develop an informational theory of elections held under conditions that prevail in the post-Cold War, when foreign powers are reluctant to provide direct support for dictators (or their opponents) and elections are more reflective of the true level of a leader’s strength. We argue that, under these conditions, elections may prevent the eruption of a civil war that is already imminent, through two mechanisms: they may deter a weak opposition from initiating a war they are likely to lose or they may induce a weak dictator to offer ways to share power with the opposition.

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Section: Estimated Effects Of Endogenous Multiparty Elections On Civimentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Estimated Effects Of Endogenous Multiparty Elections On Civimentioning

confidence: 99%

Elections and Civil War in Africa

Cheibub¹,

Hays²

2015

PSRM

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“…Gerschewski (2013) identifies three pillars of authoritarian regime stabilization mechanisms: repression, co-optation, and legitimation, with all three pillars evident in Russian pasportizatsiya strategies within Crimea. While repressive elements of authoritarian regimes are directed at the larger population, much of the research conducted into co-optation mechanisms have predominately dealt with this at an elite level (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007;Holbig, 2013;Kailitz, 2013;Magaloni, 2008;Reuter & Robertson, 2015). However, co-optation need not be a phenomenon exclusively involving elites nor is it uniform phenomenon.…”

Section: Contextualizing Pasportizatsiyamentioning

confidence: 99%

Authoritarian regime stabilization through legitimation, popular co-optation, and exclusion: Russianpasportizatsiyastrategies in Crimea

Wrighton

2017

Globalizations

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In the spring of 2014, Russian authorities distributed, rapidly and on mass, Russian passports to their newly and controversially acquired citizens within Crimea. This passport distribution strategy, or pasportizatsiya, can be seen as a continuation of the Soviet practice which was conducted to spatially control a population. In focusing on the most contemporary instance of this practice, this paper asks: how and why did pasportizatsiya take place in Crimea? The research involved a processed-focused empirical data collection, consisting of interviews conducted with Crimeans and NGO representatives. The article finds that distribution of Russian passports to Ukrainian citizens in Crimea provided the Russian Federation with a regime stabilization mechanism, through the population within their new and controversially acquired territorial borders.

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“…In human history, moving from the land and agricultural production to the industry and manufacturing production, the social relations between the groups have produced cleavages and 1 They follow the way opened by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). 2 According to Ghandi and Przeworski (2007), the autocratic ruler could solve the problem constituted by the opposition in two ways: if the threat comes from inside the ruling groups, "consultative councils, juntas, and political bureaus" will be created to permit the confrontation between the different ideas; if there is an outside threat coming from powerful groups, institutions that nominally could be grouped under the democratic procedures are established.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%