Assurance Case to Structure COTS Hardware Component Assurance for Safety-Critical Avionics

Schwierz, Andreas; Forsberg, Håkan

doi:10.1109/dasc.2018.8569774

Cited by 4 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…Steele & Knight [8] proposed the Filter Model method, in which a certification process is characterized as a safety-critical system where a system that should be rejected may be incorrectly certified, and this is considered an accident. Ruiz et al [9], and Schwierz & Forsberg [10] conducted their assurance cases proposing an audit method that uses the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) method. Habli & Kelly [11] associated the GSN method with Goal Question Metrics (GQM) method.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Requirements for a Software Audit Model in Safety-Critical Domains

Slavov,

Marques,

Martins

2020

Anais Do Workshop Em Engenharia De Requisitos

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This paper presents the requirements for a more flexible and adaptable Software Audit Model and its associated adaptable checklist to conduct a software audit. This flexibility allows applying the SAM independently of the software development life cycle chosen. The initial proposed SAM will enable us to evaluate, integrate, and adapt the Stages of Involvement in different software development cycles based on the events necessary for aircraft certification with safety-critical software.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Requirements for a Software Audit Model in Safety-Critical Domains

Slavov,

Marques,

Martins

2020

Anais Do Workshop Em Engenharia De Requisitos

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“…An assurance case is a structured argument, backed-up with evidence, that a system operates as intended for a defined application in a defined environment [7]. In [1] we demonstrated the use of an assurance case to structure COTS hardware components' assurance for safetycritical avionics and in [2] we refined our work and introduced a five-step process (see Section 2.3 in this paper) to provide a concept to connect the demonstration of assurance objectives. The use of assurance cases is in line with FAA's process to streamline the certification process by delivering an approach (Overarching Properties) usable for both software and hardware development to ease the use of alternative means of compliance [8].…”

Section: 3384/ecp19162015mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The use of COTS components therefore requires other assurance guidance techniques to be used. The certification authorities have identified and produced several COTS assurance guidance documents, see Section IV in [1] for a literature review of these. When new technology has been introduced, new assurance activities have been suggested by the authorities.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Objectivesbased guidance benefits from being more flexible to adapt future technologies rather than activities-based documents. 1 MDH's work in this paper is supported by the Swedish Knowledge Foundation within the DPAC project Dependable Platforms for Autonomous systems and Control.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Explanation of used GSN symbolsIn[1] we defined the top goal COTS component operates demonstrably airworthy in its system context for assuring a COTS integrated in safety-critical avionics. The top goal is based on applicable functional and safety certification specifications (CS) requirements, derived to the COTS component level by Berthon et al[12].…”

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Assurance Strategy for New Computing Platforms in Safety-Critical Avionics

Forsberg

Schwierz

Lundqvist

2019

Proceedings of the 10th Aerospace Technology Congress, October 8-9, 2019, Stockholm, Sweden

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An assurance strategy for new computing platforms in safety-critical avionics has to be flexible and take into account different types of commercial-of-the-shelf (COTS) hardware technologies. Completely new COTS technologies are already being introduced and successfully used in other domains. Good examples are heterogeneous platforms, hardware-based machine learning and approximate computing. Current avionics certification guidance material cannot cope with next generation of devices. We suggest using the generic assurance approach of the Overarching Properties (OPs) together with assurance cases to argument that COTS assurance objectives are met and to achieve the flexibility required for future computing platforms. We introduce a novel assurance cased-based OP approach in [1] and refine the work into a framework in [2]. Within this framework we are able to integrate COTS technology specific assurance objectives using a five-step process. In this paper, we show through some representative examples of emerging computing platforms that our strategy is a way forward for new platforms in safety-critical avionics.

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Emerging COTS-Based Computing Platforms in Avionics Need a New Assurance Concept

Forsberg

Schwierz

2019

2019 IEEE/AIAA 38th Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC)

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Assurance Case to Structure COTS Hardware Component Assurance for Safety-Critical Avionics

Cited by 4 publications

References 0 publications

Requirements for a Software Audit Model in Safety-Critical Domains

Requirements for a Software Audit Model in Safety-Critical Domains

Assurance Strategy for New Computing Platforms in Safety-Critical Avionics

Emerging COTS-Based Computing Platforms in Avionics Need a New Assurance Concept

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