Are We all Natural Dualists? A Cognitive Developmental Approach*

Astuti, Rita

doi:10.1111/1467-9655.00071

Cited by 91 publications

(45 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…1976). On Madagascar, it is said that inherited potential is flexible, and that membership in hereditary groups is fixed at death rather than birth (Astuti 2001). …”

Section: Kinship and Cultural Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There may be a similar disconnect in the psychology of kinship. Some evidence comes from the Vezo of Madagascar (Astuti 2001; see also Bloch, Solomon and Carey 2001, for the Zafimaniry, another Madagascan group). Like many other Austronesian speakers, the Vezo profess that individuals take on the character of their surroundings.…”

Section: Kinship and Cultural Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In short, at some level, Vezo do not reason in accordance with their professed beliefs. Rita Astuti (2001) argues that these beliefs constitute an ideology, which supports cultural practices like adoption and the symbolic demotion of nuclear family ties in favour of wider connections. However, this explicit ideology coexists with an implicit concept of kinship close to the western one.…”

Section: Kinship and Cultural Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Kinship in Mind: Three Approaches

Jones¹

2018

Focality and Extension in Kinship: Essays in Memory of Harold W. Scheffler

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Social anthropologists mostly study kinship as a principle of social organisation. But there is also a psychological and cognitive side to human kinship, involving questions like: How do people recognise others as kin of one sort or another? What do kin categories mean and how are they related to one another? What, if anything, distinguishes thinking about kinship from other varieties of social cognition? Different schools of anthropology offer very different answers to these questions. Here I review three approaches to the psychology of kinship. One has its roots in evolutionary theory and human/nonhuman comparisons. The second is concerned with symbolism, culture, and the natives' explicit theories of procreation and kinship. These approaches are likely to be familiar to students of evolution and human behaviour, and cultural anthropology, respectively. The third approach stems from recent developments in cognitive science, especially in the study of specialised domains of cognition. This approach is newest, and probably least familiar to most anthropologists and even to most cognitive scientists, so it receives most attention here. I argue that human beings have a specialised cognitive system-which can be called 'kinship core cognition' or 'kinship conceptual structure'-comprising a set of universal building blocks for organising knowledge of kin and kin categories in an abstract kinship space. Much of the success of formal methods in the study of kin

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“…1976). On Madagascar, it is said that inherited potential is flexible, and that membership in hereditary groups is fixed at death rather than birth (Astuti 2001). …”

Section: Kinship and Cultural Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Kinship and Cultural Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Kinship and Cultural Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Kinship in Mind: Three Approaches

Jones¹

2018

Focality and Extension in Kinship: Essays in Memory of Harold W. Scheffler

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“…16 Para perspectivas mais ou menos radicais que adotam essa abordagem, ver, por exemplo, Boyer (1994Boyer ( , 2001, Astuti (2001) e Tremlin (2006. Whitehouse (2000Whitehouse ( , 2004 adota uma abordagem um pouco diferente, embora relacionada.…”

Section: Notasunclassified

Antropologia e psicologia

Toren¹,

Villalobos²

2012

Rev. bras. Ci. Soc.

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invenção da antropologia psicológica e a década seguinte trouxe-nos a psicologia cultural. Nos anos de 1990 redescobrimos o corpo e a fenomenologia e, ao mesmo tempo, testemunhamos o ressurgimento da antropologia cognitiva, a qual durante a primeira década do século XXI parece dominar o campo, contribuindo para o desenvolvimento do que hoje se chama ciência cognitiva. Nas próximas décadas, a antropologia cognitiva continuará dominando nosso entendimento da mente se seu projeto intelectual for capaz de enfrentar as reais implicações políticas do conceito a-histórico de ser humano que se encontra em seu âmago.O argumento deste texto é explicitamente oposto aos modelos cognitivistas, tendo em vista a incapacidade destes em lidar com a realidade histó-rica humana, em geral, e com sua própria natureza histórica, em particular. Assim, não obstante o trabalho muitas vezes fascinante realizado nos vários subcampos da antropologia, e apesar da explosão do Os antropólogos que trabalham na interface entre psicologia e antropologia estão de modo geral comprometidos com a antropologia como ciência. O problema para nós, entretanto, é que, no final do século XIX e início de século XX, o desenvolvimento institucional das ciências humanas segmentou entre diferentes disciplinas os diversos aspectos do que deve ser considerado o humano. Em face dos domínios epistemológicos separados da antropologia, psicologia, sociologia, linguística, filosofia e biologia, os cientistas da última metade do século XX viram-

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“…Elementary forms of cognitive grasping of these principles might be available at early stages in the development of human cognition (e.g., Baillargeon, 2001;Spelke, 1990), with a more explicit understanding of them emerging in adult sensorimotor skills (Ballard, Hayhoe, Pook, & Rao, 1997;Gibson, 1979;Noë, 2004) and adult 'folk physics' (McCloskey, 1983;McCloskey, Caramazza, & Green, 1980). On the other hand, humans can also interact with and reason about existing, dead or fictional animated 6 and intentional agents-i.e., animated creatures to whom we ascribe intentional states such as beliefs, desires and intentions (e.g., Astuti, 2001;Bloom, 2002Bloom, , 2004Bonatti, Frot, Zangl, & Mehler, 2002;Dennett, 1971Dennett, , 1987Koenig, Clément, & Harris, 2004;Malle, Moses, & Baldwin, 2001;Puccetti, 1968). In order to account for the behavior of such agents we need to add principles not reducible to those used to track physical objects.…”

Section: Components Of Singular Reference and Cognitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A study in the cognition of individuals’ identity: Solving the problem of singular cognition in object and agent tracking

Bullot

Rysiew

2007

Consciousness and Cognition

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This article compares the ability to track individuals lacking mental states with the ability to track intentional agents. It explains why reference to individuals raises the problem of explaining how cognitive agents track unique individuals and in what sense reference is based on procedures of perceptual-motor and epistemic tracking. We suggest applying the notion of singular-files from theories in perception and semantics to the problem of tracking intentional agents. In order to elucidate the nature of agent-files, three views of the relation between object-and agent-tracking are distinguished: the Independence, Deflationary and Organism-Dependence Views. The correct view is argued to be the latter, which states that perceptual and epistemic tracking of a unique human organism requires tracking both its spatio-temporal object-properties and its agent-properties.

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Are We all Natural Dualists? A Cognitive Developmental Approach*

Cited by 91 publications

References 23 publications

Kinship in Mind: Three Approaches

Kinship in Mind: Three Approaches

Antropologia e psicologia

A study in the cognition of individuals’ identity: Solving the problem of singular cognition in object and agent tracking

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