Are normative properties descriptive properties?

Streumer, Bart

doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9534-z

Cited by 13 publications

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References 34 publications

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“…See Horgan and Timmons (: 231–232), Streumer (: 330–334), Williams (: 136), Zangwill (: 284) and supra note 2.…”

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The Significance of Significant Fundamental Moral Disagreement¹

Rowland

2016

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This paper has four parts. In the first part I argue that moral facts are subject to a certain epistemic accessibility requirement. Namely, moral facts must be accessible to some possible agent. In the second part I show that because this accessibility requirement on moral facts holds, there is a route from facts about the moral disagreements of agents in idealized conditions to conclusions about what moral facts there are. In the third part I build on this route to show that (*) if there is significant moral disagreement in idealized conditions, then our understanding of morality is fatally flawed and we should accept relativism over non‐naturalism and quasi‐realism. So, if, like many, you think that there would be significant moral disagreement in idealized conditions, you should hold that our understanding of morality is fatally flawed and reject non‐naturalism and quasi‐realism. In the fourth part of this paper I show that (*) undermines the plausibility of non‐naturalism, quasi‐realism, and the view that our understanding of morality is not fatally flawed even if we do not have sufficient reason to believe that there would be significant moral disagreement in idealized conditions.

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“…See Horgan and Timmons (: 231–232), Streumer (: 330–334), Williams (: 136), Zangwill (: 284) and supra note 2.…”

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The Significance of Significant Fundamental Moral Disagreement¹

Rowland

2016

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“…Error theory received its first major defence from J.L. Mackie (), and it finds contemporary advocates in Richard Garner (), Richard Joyce (; ; ), Bart Streumer (; ) and Jonas Olson (; ), among others. If error theory is true, an obvious question arises.…”

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After Moral Error Theory, After Moral Realism

Ingram¹

2015

The Southern J of Philosophy

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Moral abolitionists recommend that we get rid of moral discourse and moral judgement. At first glance this seems repugnant, but abolitionists think that we have overestimated the practical value of our moral framework and that eliminating it would be in our interests. I argue that abolitionism has a surprising amount going for it. Traditionally, abolitionism has been treated as an option available to moral error theorists. Error theorists say that moral discourse and judgement are committed to the existence of moral properties, and that no such properties exist. After error theory is established, abolitionism is one potential way to proceed. However, many error theorists suggest that we retain moral discourse as a sort of fiction. I evaluate some attractions of both fictionalism and abolitionism, arguing that abolitionism is a plausible position. No one doubts that error theorists can be abolitionists. However, what has gone largely undiscussed is that it is open to others to be abolitionists as well. I argue that moral realists of a metaphysically robust sort can and perhaps should be abolitionists. 'Realist abolitionism' makes for a surprisingly neat theoretical package, and I conclude that it represents an interesting new option in the theoretical landscape.

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“…These philosophers think that normative judgements partly aim to represent the world the way cognitivists think they do, but that the properties these judgements ascribe are not irreducibly normative. I do not have space to discuss these views here, but I think they face either the objections to reductive realism I put forward in Streumer or the argument against non‐cognitivism I shall put forward below.…”

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Do Normative Judgements Aim to Represent the World?

Streumer

2013

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Are normative properties descriptive properties?

Cited by 13 publications

References 34 publications

The Significance of Significant Fundamental Moral Disagreement¹

The Significance of Significant Fundamental Moral Disagreement¹

After Moral Error Theory, After Moral Realism

Do Normative Judgements Aim to Represent the World?

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Are normative properties descriptive properties?

Cited by 13 publications

References 34 publications

The Significance of Significant Fundamental Moral Disagreement1

The Significance of Significant Fundamental Moral Disagreement1

After Moral Error Theory, After Moral Realism

Do Normative Judgements Aim to Represent the World?

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The Significance of Significant Fundamental Moral Disagreement¹

The Significance of Significant Fundamental Moral Disagreement¹