Are labour inspections effective when labour regulations vary according to the size of the firm? Evidence from Peru

Viollaz, Mariana

doi:10.1111/ilr.12107

Cited by 5 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…However, strict labor regulations on paper are not guaranteed to be enforced, resulting in unequal competition conditions and less security for workers LAGE, 2005;BASU;CHAU;KANBUR, 2010;RONCONI, 2016;VIOLLAZ, 2018). In terms of generating incentives to adequacy (through the intention of punishment violators) and aiming to narrow the gap between the de jure and the de facto one, the main public policy is inspection (PIORE;SCHRANK, 2008;RONCONI, 2018).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…His main conclusion is that the firms' propensity to evade regulations is inversely related to the probability of being caught multiplied by the expected fine. In this way, increased enforcement would increase compliance because it would increase the likelihood of being inspected and fined (VIOLLAZ, 2018).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There are not many empirical studies about the effects of inspections on compliance yet, especially about the Brazilian labor market. Using the instrumental variables method 1 and data at the region/city/province level, the evidence suggests little correlation between increased inspections and labor regulation compliance in Argentina and Peru (RONCONI, 2010;VIOLLAZ, 2018) and no correlation with minimum wage compliance in South Africa (BHORAT; KANBUR; MAYET, 2012).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…After all, if society does not adapt to changes in regulations, the effects will be small. Recent studies that evaluate the impact of an increase in inspection intensity show a rise in compliance with labor law in Brazil, Argentina and Peru (ALMEIDA;NARITA, 2013;RONCONI, 2010;VIOLLAZ, 2018). In South Africa, results indicate a null effect of raise enforcement on compliance with minimum wage law (BHORAT; KANBUR; MAYET, 2012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Ronconi (2010) uses electoral years as an instrumental variable because it would affect enforcement agencies but has no direct effect on firms' propensities to comply with labor regulations. Bhorat,Kanbur and Mayet (2012) use the number of non-inspectors as enforcement instruments, that is, the number of workers in the labor inspection sectors who do not participate in inspection effectively Viollaz (2018). proposes measurement of the "arrival cost"of labor inspector as an instrument to enforcement.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Do labor inspections make a difference? An analysis of establishments in Brazil

Lira¹

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Estabelecimentos em todo o mundo enfrentam um trade-off entre seguir a lei e incorrer em custos trabalhistas mais altos ou fugir dos regulamentos e correr o risco de punição. Neste contexto, a inspeção do trabalho é a principal política pública que visa reduzir o hiato entre as leis no papel e o seu cumprimento pela sociedade. Este trabalho estuda como as inspeções afetam os resultados das empresas no Brasil. Exploramos o fato de que estabelecimentos não são avisados sobre o ato de fiscalização, o que torna o momento da ação exógeno. Combinamos os dados das empresas inspecionadas entre 2007 e 2017 com os dados administrativos do empregador-empregado (RAIS). Usando uma amostra com empresas inspecionadas apenas uma vez no período ou nunca inspecionadas que tinham entre 10 e 500 funcionários inicialmente e adotando as abordagens de estudo de evento/diferença-em-diferença, descobrimos que receber a fiscalização afeta negativamente o estabelecimento. Observa-se um declínio nos oito trimestres seguintes a fiscalização no emprego, contratação, separação e salários. O efeito médio é de cerca de 16,47%, 17,39%, 11,31% e 4,26% respectivamente. Também é documentado uma pequena mudança na composição da mão de obra devido à fiscalização, contratos mais flexíveis e menos horas contratadas. Além disso, os estabelecimentos do setor de construção e serviços são os mais afetados, assim como as empresas com 50 a 100 empregados. Argumentamos que o principal canal pode ser via aumento dos custos trabalhistas.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Do labor inspections make a difference? An analysis of establishments in Brazil

Lira¹

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Payroll Taxes, Social Security, and Informality: The 2012 Tax Reform in Colombia

Garlati-Bertoldi¹

2020

Research in Labor Economics

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Information and communication technology adoption in micro and small firms: Can internet access improve labour productivity?

Viollaz

2019

Development Policy Review

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The rapid spread of information and communication technologies (ICT) may increase firms’ productivity with important consequences for job creation and for economic growth. This article contributes to this discussion by analysing the impact of internet adoption on labour productivity and the mechanisms shaping this relationship in Peruvian micro and small manufacturing firms over the period 2011–2013. The article estimates a reduced form where labour productivity is a function of internet adoption and other explanatory factors. Internet adoption is instrumented using a measure of the availability of financial opportunities for micro and small firms in Peru. Findings indicate that internet adoption: (a) increases firms’ labour productivity; (b) reallocates employment away from temporary administrative workers and non‐remunerated workers and expands employment of permanent production workers; (c) leads to the formalization of labour relationships, to the implementation of new organizational practices and to the improvement of training measures. While changes in employment and formalization of workers are linked to labour productivity gains, increases in training measures and organizational changes do not generate any additional productivity increase. Policies oriented to promote the adoption of ICT in micro and small firms can be beneficial to close the productivity gap with larger firms in Peru. Moreover, policies directed to the formalization of the workforce can provide an extra benefit, i.e. additional labour productivity gains in firms adopting the internet. Finally, policies oriented to the development of digital skills are also important to ease the re‐employment of those workers losing their jobs and the achievement of additional productivity gains that new organizational practices can provide.

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Are labour inspections effective when labour regulations vary according to the size of the firm? Evidence from Peru

Cited by 5 publications

References 20 publications

Do labor inspections make a difference? An analysis of establishments in Brazil

Do labor inspections make a difference? An analysis of establishments in Brazil

Payroll Taxes, Social Security, and Informality: The 2012 Tax Reform in Colombia

Information and communication technology adoption in micro and small firms: Can internet access improve labour productivity?

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