Ao relator, tudo: o impacto do aumento do poder do ministro relator no Supremo

Hartmann, Ivar A.; Ferreira, Lívia da Silva

doi:10.12662/2447-6641oj.v13i17.p268-283.2015

Cited by 8 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Finally, the greatest number of the decisions are taken by singular justices, as indicated in Table 1. Silva Ferreira, 2016). This has been a departure from the subjects that used to dominate judicial politics studies, e.g.…”

Section: A New Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Common strategies used by justices, among others, are: a) the employment of an institutional mechanism called "pedido de vista, " which allows any justice to delay a judgment in order to give the case greater deliberation; (Arguelhes & Hartmann, 2017;Arguelhes & Ribeiro, 2016); b) the role of the rapporteur to stop a case or make decisions by him/herself without consulting other justices, (Arguelhes & Ribeiro, 2016, 2018a, 2018bHartmann & da Silva Ferreira, 2016) and; c) the role of the head of the Supreme Court to determine which lawsuits will be judged. I argue that the institutions emphasized in this new literature might have implications on traditional phenomena studied in judicial politics, such as judicial independence.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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How Many Justices Does it Take to Control the Court

Duarte¹

2018

Preprint

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The literature on judicial politics has usually suggested that presidents could guarantee their influence over Supreme Courts’ decisions provided that presidents nominate at least half of thebench. I argue, however, that this is not always the case, as in some courts, individual justices have primacy over the collectivebody. I develop a model that states that the control of the agenda power by individual justices is a determinant factor for understandingjudicial independence. The Brazilian Supreme Court serves as a goodcase, as there are several institutional rules that allow each justice to pause or change the result of a judgment, without consultinghis or her peers. My research design focuses on three cases studies ofthe court and 3,043 decisions, which I analyze using matching. Results showthat, when the government has a strong interest in a particular lawsuit, the probability of this lawsuit being halted by a SupremeCourt justice is higher. The fact that presidents can influenceindividual justices, and in turn these justices can affect thecourse of a lawsuit, sheds new light on the role that judicial independence has when considering presidents’ influence over Supreme Court decisions.

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Section: A New Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Many Justices Does it Take to Control the Court

Duarte¹

2018

Preprint

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“…Das mais de 1,3 milhão de decisões que o STF tomou de 1988 até 2011, menos de 0,6% foram tomadas pelos 11 ministros reunidos em Plenário. Se, no desenho original de 1988, o STF foi pensado como um órgão colegiado, ao menos em termos quantitativos o tribunal parece ter se transformado em algo distinto na prática (FALCÃO; CERDEIRA; ARGUELHES, 2013;HARTMANN;FERREIRA, 2015).…”

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Criatura e/ou Criador:transformações do Supremo Tribunal Federal sob a Constituição de 1988

Arguelhes

Ribeiro

2016

Rev. direito GV

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ResumoAtualmente, o Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) ocupa hoje posição central no processo político nacional. Suas decisões são a última palavra oficial sobre os temas a que se referem, concentrando poderes para resolver conflitos políticos e morais, para além das esferas majoritárias. Esse cenário, porém, é muito diferente dos anos 1990, quando o STF não ocupava posição tão destacada na política brasileira. Neste artigo, discutiremos essa configuração do poder e do papel do STF por meio de análises do tribunal que a constituinte criou, mas também do que os ministros criaram por meio de práticas institucionais e interpretações de seus próprios poderes. Exploraremos algumas consequências mais recentes da manifestação do próprio poder conferido ao STF nesse processo de reconfiguração institucional, delineando, de maneira preliminar, novas tendências na forma de atuação política do tribunal. Argumentamos, também, que, em vez de atuar apenas como ponto de veto a decisões majoritárias, como câmara revisora do que faz o Congresso, o tribunal já sinalizou disposição para receber (e aceitar) provocações para funcionar como uma espécie de primeira câmara legislativa. Palavras-chaveSupremo Tribunal Federal; desenho institucional; processo decisório judicial; comportamento judicial. Abstract The Brazilian Supreme Federal Court (STF) occupies a central role in the national political process. The court´s decisions have been the last official word on many key constitutional controversies, and it has increasingly asserted its own powers to solve political and moral conflicts, even against majoritarian decisions. This scenario, however, is very different from the 90s, when the court was much less relevant in national politics. In this paper, we engage with and try to map this process of institutional transformation by analyzing and contrasting the court that the constitution created in its original text, and the court that the

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‘The Court, it is I’? Individual judicial powers in the Brazilian Supreme Court and their implications for constitutional theory

Arguelhes

Ribeiro

2018

Glob. Con.

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Abstract:Collective decision-making is often taken as an ‘institutional fact’ when it comes to supreme and constitutional courts. In this article, we focus on the example of the Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal, or STF) to argue that this feature should not be assumed from the outset, as it does not necessarily hold, across countries, for all relevant powers that courts may have. As this example illustrates, the assignment to individual Justices of three distinct powers, namely agenda setting, position taking, and decision making, can have profound effects on the legislative status quo outside the court, amounting in some circumstances to a form of individual judicial review. This expanded typology of court powers both points to an underexplored spectrum for comparing different courts and makes it necessary to discuss if and how particular distributions of such powers within multi-member courts are normatively justified. In the specific case of the STF, we argue that the specific combination of individual allocations of agenda setting and decision-making powers, which gives rise in practice to the possibility of individual judicial review, cannot be reconciled with basic tenets of constitutional theory.

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Ao relator, tudo: o impacto do aumento do poder do ministro relator no Supremo

Cited by 8 publications

References 1 publication

How Many Justices Does it Take to Control the Court

How Many Justices Does it Take to Control the Court

Criatura e/ou Criador:transformações do Supremo Tribunal Federal sob a Constituição de 1988

‘The Court, it is I’? Individual judicial powers in the Brazilian Supreme Court and their implications for constitutional theory

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