2003
DOI: 10.1016/s0022-1996(02)00055-7
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Antidumping and retaliation threats

Abstract: We propose and test two ways in which retaliation threats may dampen the antidumping (AD) activity we observe. First, the threat of retaliatory AD actions may make a domestic industry less likely to name a foreign import source in an AD petition. Second, the prospect of a GATT/WTO trade dispute may make government agencies less likely to rule positive in their AD decision. Using a nested logit framework, we find evidence that both retaliation threats substantially affect U.S. AD activity from 1980 through 1998. Show more

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Cited by 239 publications
(161 citation statements)
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“…Blonigen and Bown (2003) provide empirical support for the cold war theory. They show that holding other factors constant, the United States tends to file AD actions against countries that do not have an AD statute.…”
Section: Concluding Commentsmentioning
confidence: 55%
“…Blonigen and Bown (2003) provide empirical support for the cold war theory. They show that holding other factors constant, the United States tends to file AD actions against countries that do not have an AD statute.…”
Section: Concluding Commentsmentioning
confidence: 55%
“…Finally, and most importantly, it is not the case that all NTBs are noncooperative. Some NTBs, such as quotas, are set cooperatively, while even the least cooperative policiesantidumping duties -have been shown to respond to foreign bargaining power (see Blonigen and Bown, 2003).…”
Section: Results From the Tokyo Roundmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Examples of papers that have used this data include Prusa andSkeath (2002, 2005) and Feinberg and Reynolds (forthcoming) which focus on retaliation threats. Related papers that motivate some of this emphasis on cross-country linkages also include Blonigen and Bown (2003) and Bown (2005). There is also some emerging research from other user countries which exploits more detailed data that has been collected on an individual basis -an example is the Mexican use of antidumping examined by Niels and Francois (forthcoming).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%