Analysis of product return rate and price competition in two supply chains

Zheng, Yanyan; Shu, Tong; Wang, Shouyang; Lai, Kin Keung; Gan, Lu

doi:10.1007/s12351-016-0273-6

Cited by 25 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…It is assumed that price-dependent demands with imperfect product substitutability, as well as the market demand is decreasing in self-freight price and increasing in competitor's price. Thus, the demand is specified as a linear function [5,42]:…”

Section: Model Formulation and Notationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Withdrawn: Optimal cap setting and pricing in supply chains under vertical-horizontal cooperation and cap-and-trade regulation

Shang

Qin

et al. 2021

RAIRO-Oper. Res.

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The main body of competition has changed from the competition between enterprises to the competition between supply chains. The cooperation of the chain-to-chain attracts large attention from entrepreneurs and scholars in an increasingly competitive environment. Thus, this paper studies a chain-to-chain system with price competition consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer in each supply chain under carbon cap-and-trade regulation. Considering vertical-horizontal cooperation, the six different models are established by introducing the structural cooperation and the contractual cooperation (adopting the wholesale price contract) of supply chains. Based on the Stackelbeg game and Nash game, the optimal solutions of six models are obtained. The results show that the decisions, profits, and social welfare of the supply chains are affected by the structural cooperation than the contractual cooperation. The asymmetric competition structure changes the bargaining power of the supply chains. The relationship of supply chains' pricing only is affected by the cooperation structures. The relationship of the cap setting, profits, and social welfare are affected by the cooperation structures and the main decision parameters.

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Section: Model Formulation and Notationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Withdrawn: Optimal cap setting and pricing in supply chains under vertical-horizontal cooperation and cap-and-trade regulation

Shang

Qin

et al. 2021

RAIRO-Oper. Res.

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“…Crocker and Letizia [13] found that the retailer may take concealed actions to reduce the expected sales of products; the best policy for the retailer for return goods is that the manufacturer requires the retailer to pay full wholesale payment. Zheng et al [14] examined how product return rates of the reverse chain influenced the determination of market price and profits of two supply chains in different competition structures. Giri and Sharma [15] found that, under the condition of sequential optimization, the acceptable quality levels of retailers’ returns were lower than those of global optimization, and integration of supply chain members led to a decrease in the number of deliveries from manufacturers to retailers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Dynamic Price Game Model in a Low-Carbon, Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Return Rates and Fairness Concern Behaviors

Shi

Huang

2019

IJERPH

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In this paper, we developed a dynamic price game model for a low-carbon, closed-loop supply chain system in which (1) the manufacturer had fairness concern and carbon emission reduction (CER) behaviors, and market share and profit maximization were their objectives, and (2) the retailer showed fairness concern behaviors in market competition and provided service input to reduce return rates. The retailer recycled old products from customers, and the manufacturer remanufactured the recycled old products. The effects of different parameter values on the stability and utility of the dynamic price game model were determined through analysis and numerical simulation. Results found that an increasing customer loyalty to the direct marketing channel decreased the stable region of the manufacturer’s price adjustment and increase that of the retailer. The stable region of the system shrank with an increase of CER and the retailer’s service level, which expanded with return rates. The dynamic system entered into chaos through flip bifurcation with the increase of price adjustment speed. In the chaotic state, the average utilities of the manufacturer and retailer all declined, while that of the retailer declined even more. Changes to parameter values had a great impact on the utilities of the manufacturer and retailer. By selecting appropriate control parameters, the dynamic system can return to a stable state from chaos again. The research of this paper is of great significance to participants’ price decision-making and supply chain operation management.

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“…Recycling and remanufacturing of waste products have become an important strategic operation of a modern enterprise, and it may bring produce significant economic and social benefits [11]. In this regard, Zheng et al [45] presented a comparison between a conventional and a reverse supply chain in the Betrand Competition. Pan et al [26] analyzed reverse logistics costs and benefits to explore the advantage of reverse logistics over the traditional supply chain.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analyzing a socially responsible closed-loop distribution channel with recycling facility

Modak¹,

Sinha

Panda

et al. 2019

SN Appl. Sci.

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This paper deals with a closed-loop distribution channel consisting of a socially responsible manufacturer, multiple retailers and a third party collector. In reality, collection of used products (plastic, glass, metal) by a third party collector is more common than the collection through retailers. This is because retailers generally faces difficulties such as lack of space and manpower. Aligned with many closed loop supply chains, this paper assumes that the third party operates the reverse channel by collecting the used products. The third party collects used products, segregates recyclable items and sends them to the manufacturer for further use. The manufacturer not only shows social responsibility to the stakeholders and shareholders, but also collects the used products from the third party and recycles them to new products. Considering profit maximizing motives of the channel members, the paper examines the effect of manufacturer's degree of social responsibility on the collection activity of the third party. Under manufacturer Stackelberg game setting, it is found that product recycling is directly proportional to the manufacturer's corporate social responsibility (CSR) concerns and there must be a threshold of recycling for the optimal benefit that can be acquired through CSR practice. The proposed model is illustrated by a numerical example and a sensitivity analysis reveals nature of the parameters.

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Analysis of product return rate and price competition in two supply chains

Cited by 25 publications

References 44 publications

Withdrawn: Optimal cap setting and pricing in supply chains under vertical-horizontal cooperation and cap-and-trade regulation

Withdrawn: Optimal cap setting and pricing in supply chains under vertical-horizontal cooperation and cap-and-trade regulation

A Dynamic Price Game Model in a Low-Carbon, Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Return Rates and Fairness Concern Behaviors

Analyzing a socially responsible closed-loop distribution channel with recycling facility

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