This paper aims to make explicit the methodological conditions that should be satisfied for the Bayesian model to be used as a normative model of human probability judgment. After noticing the lack of a clear definition of Bayesianism in the psychological literature and the lack of justification for using it, a classic definition of subjective Bayesianism is recalled, based on the following three criteria: An epistemic criterion, a static coherence criterion and a dynamic coherence criterion. Then it is shown that the adoption of this framework has two kinds of implications. The first one regards the methodology of the experimental study of probability judgment. The Bayesian framework creates pragmatic constraints on the methodology that are linked to the interpretation of, and the belief in, the information presented, or referred to, by an experimenter in order for it to be the basis of a probability judgment by individual participants. It is shown that these constraints have not been satisfied in the past, and the question of whether they can be satisfied in principle is raised and answered negatively. The second kind of implications consists of two limitations in the scope of the Bayesian model. They regard (i) the background of revision (the Bayesian model considers only revising situations but not updating situations), and (ii) the notorious case of the null priors. In both cases Lewis' rule is an appropriate alternative to Bayes' rule, but its use faces the same operational difficulties.Keywords Probability judgment • Subjective Bayesianism • Bayesian coherence • Probability revising • Probability updating • Linguistic pragmatics 2
IntroductionIn the imposing literature devoted to the psychological study of probability judgment, the use of a theoretical model as a referential norm for "rational" behavior is a usual methodology.1 Since the pioneering study by Rouanet (1961), and following the famous article by Edwards et al. (1963), the Bayesian model of probability has been the most frequently used as a normative reference or as a possible descriptive model. The implicit question that these studies attempt to answer is whether human beings perform probability judgment in a "Bayesian" manner. These interrogations go far beyond the realm of psychology: They also apply to the various domains that use the Bayesian model, such as economics (Davis and Holt 1993), law (Callen 1982), medicine (Casscells et al. 1978), artificial intelligence (Cohen 1985) and philosophy (Stich 1990).The present paper is not directly aimed towards these important debates concerning probabilistic functioning in humans, but is rather a methodological examination of the conditions under which the Bayesian model may be used as a normative theory. In other words, it aims to find an answer to the following question: Does the psychological literature take into consideration the various implications and constraints imposed by the usage of the Bayesian model as a normative reference? It will be argued that the answer is negative, an...