Airport Quarantine Inspection, Follow-Up Observation, and the Prevention of Pandemic Influenza

A scoping search and a systematic literature review were conducted to give an insight on entry and exit screening referring to travelers at points of entry, by analyzing published evidence on practices, guidelines, and experiences in the past 15 years worldwide. Grey literature, PubMed. and Scopus were searched using specific terms. Most of the available data identified through the systematic literature review concerned entry screening measures at airports. Little evidence is available about entry and exit screening measure implementation and effectiveness at ports and ground crossings. Exit screening was part of the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) temporary recommendations for implementation in certain points of entry, for specific time periods. Exit screening measures for Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) in the three most affected West African countries did not identify any cases and showed zero sensitivity and very low specificity. The percentages of confirmed cases identified out of the total numbers of travelers that passed through entry screening measures in various countries worldwide for Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) and EVD in West Africa were zero or extremely low. Entry screening measures for Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) did not detect any confirmed SARS cases in Australia, Canada, and Singapore. Despite the ineffectiveness of entry and exit screening measures, authors reported several important concomitant positive effects that their impact is difficult to assess, including discouraging travel of ill persons, raising awareness, and educating the traveling public and maintaining operation of flights from/to the affected areas. Exit screening measures in affected areas are important and should be applied jointly with other measures including information strategies, epidemiological investigation, contact tracing, vaccination, and quarantine to achieve a comprehensive outbreak management response. Based on review results, an algorithm about decision-making for entry/exit screening was developed.

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“…Obtaining contact information of travelers to be used if needed for contact tracing or public health observation purposes ˅ E,I [6,26]…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As shown in Table 4, from the 27 articles, 25 reported entry screening measures [6,7,8,9,10,11,15,20,21,23,24,26,27,28,29,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40] and five reported exit screening measures [6,9,16,22,28]. Figures 2–4 summarize the results of entry and exit screening measures by disease and per country.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exit and Entry Screening Practices for Infectious Diseases among Travelers at Points of Entry: Looking for Evidence on Public Health Impact

Mouchtouri

Christoforidou

Heiden

et al. 2019

IJERPH

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“…We reviewed 1 intervention study (18), 5 observational studies (6,(19)(20)(21)(22), and 10 simulation studies (Appendix Tables 9, 10). Miyaki et al (18) conducted an intervention study in Japan during 2009-2010 involving 2 companies.…”

Section: Quarantine Of Exposed Personsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, the applicability of these findings is uncertain because maritime travel is uncommon in the 21st century. Conversely, Fujita et al (19) reviewed the onboard quarantine experience at Narita International Airport in Tokyo, Japan, during the influenza A(H1N1) pdm09 pandemic, and reported that the intervention detected few cases and was ineffective in preventing virus entry into the country (19).…”

Section: Quarantine Of Exposed Personsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nonpharmaceutical Measures for Pandemic Influenza in Nonhealthcare Settings—Social Distancing Measures

Fong¹,

Gao²,

Wong³

et al. 2020

Emerg. Infect. Dis.

562

518

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E xperiences from previous influenza pandemics, in particular the 2009-10 pandemic, have demonstrated that we cannot expect to contain geographically the next influenza pandemic in the location it emerges, nor can we expect to prevent international spread of infection for more than a short period. Vaccines are not expected to be available during the early stage of the next pandemic (1), and stockpiles of antiviral drugs will be limited, mostly reserved for treating more severe illnesses and for patients at higher risk for influenza complications. Therefore, nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs), such as social distancing (2), will be heavily relied on by health authorities to slow influenza transmission in the community, with 3 desired outcomes (Figure). The first outcome would be to delay the timing of the peak of infections to buy time for preparations in the healthcare system, the second to reduce the size of the epidemic peak so that the healthcare system is not overwhelmed, and the third to spread infections over a longer time period, enabling better management of those cases and the potential for vaccines to be used at least later in the epidemic to reduce impact. Influenza virus infections are believed to spread mainly through close contact in the community (e.g., homes, workplaces, preschool and day care centers, schools, public places), and more frequent and intense contact among children has a particularly major role in transmission (5). Social distancing measures aim to reduce the frequency of contact and increase physical distance between persons, thereby reducing the risks of person-to-person transmission. These measures have played a role in mitigating previous pandemics, including the 1918-19 pandemic (6,7), and are a key part of current pandemic preparedness plans (3,4). Although a clear biological and epidemiologic rationale supports the potential effectiveness of social distancing measures, there are few opportunities for rigorous controlled trials of community interventions against influenza. Our objective was to review the evidence base for social distancing measures, focusing on the evidence supporting the effectiveness of these measures in reducing influenza transmission in the community. Methods and Results We conducted separate systematic reviews to gather available evidence on the effectiveness of 6 measures in reducing influenza transmission in the community: isolating ill persons; contact tracing; quarantining exposed persons; school dismissals or closures; workplace measures, including workplace closures; and

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“…Over the course of the last decade, airport authorities around the world in Australia (Eastwood et al, 2010), Canada (Johanis, 2007), Japan (Fujita et al, 2011) and Singapore (Wilder-Smith et al, 2003) have gained valuable experiences that are crucial to the formulation of effective and organised pandemic responses. These have been used as benchmarks for the development of future pandemic controls at airports.…”

Section: Practical Experiencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impact of pandemic control over airport economics: Reconciling public health with airport business through a streamlined approach in pandemic control

Chung¹

2015

Journal of Air Transport Management

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a b s t r a c tRapid aviation commercialisation and upsurge in worldwide affluence created a new avenue for disease proliferation across countries at an unprecedented rate. Epidemic and pandemic occurrences over the last decade demonstrate airports' role in disease transmission; while also exhibiting their importance as containment nodes. Tremendous amount of resources and effort are necessary to achieve the latter but inevitably, disrupt normal operations. The contrasting objectives between public health authorities and airport authorities result in compromising measures for both parties. Broadly similar controlling measures were adopted by various airports during outbreaks in the last decade. Their effectiveness have been analysed in terms of disease control; economic impact to airports were, however, not quantified. This paper concludes that more efficient airport pandemic control plans cause less severe economic impact on airports during pandemic and recommends a streamlined approach that improves overall effect of pandemic control while minimising economic impacts to airport businesses.

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Airport Quarantine Inspection, Follow-Up Observation, and the Prevention of Pandemic Influenza

Abstract: Quarantine inspection at the airports, follow-up observation by local authorities, and overall concomitant efforts may have contributed to secondary infection control in Japan.

Cited by 8 publications

References 0 publications

Exit and Entry Screening Practices for Infectious Diseases among Travelers at Points of Entry: Looking for Evidence on Public Health Impact

Exit and Entry Screening Practices for Infectious Diseases among Travelers at Points of Entry: Looking for Evidence on Public Health Impact

Nonpharmaceutical Measures for Pandemic Influenza in Nonhealthcare Settings—Social Distancing Measures

Impact of pandemic control over airport economics: Reconciling public health with airport business through a streamlined approach in pandemic control

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