Advancing the specification of dual process models of higher cognition: a critical test of the hybrid model view

Abstract

Dual process models of higher cognition have become very influential in the cognitive sciences. The popular Default-Interventionist model has long favored a serial view on the interaction between intuitive and deliberative processing (or System 1 and System 2). Recent work has led to an alternative hybrid model view in which people's intuitive reasoning performance is assumed to be determined by the absolute and relative strength of competing intuitions. In the present study, we tested unique new predictions to validate the hybrid model. We adopted a two-response paradigm with popular base-rate neglect problems in which baserate information and a stereotypical description could cue conflicting responses. By manipulating the extremity of the base-rates in our problems we aimed to affect the strength of the "logical" intuition that is hypothesized to cue selection of the base-rate response. The two-response paradigm-in which people were required to give an initial response under time-pressure and cognitive load-allowed us to identify the presumed intuitively generated response. Consistent with the hybrid model predictions, we observed that experimentally reducing the strength of the logical intuition decreased the number of initial base-rate responses when solving problems in which base-rates and stereotypical information conflicted. Critically, reasoners who gave an initial stereotypical response were less likely to register the intrinsic conflict (as reflected in decreased confidence) in this case, whereas reasoners who gave an initial base-rate response registered more conflict. Implications and remaining challenges for dual process theorizing are discussed.

Individual differences in logical intuitions on reasoning problems presented under two-response paradigm

“…Evans & Stanovich, 2013), participants actually managed to solve 44% of conflict reasoning problems accurately already at the initial response stage. Relatively high initial conflict reasoning accuracy has been observed also byBago and De Neys (2019). Overall performance results are completely consistent with the accuracies observed separately on both reasoning tasks.Besides analysing participant's accuracies at the initial and final response stage, the use of the two-response paradigm allows us to examine the specific directions in which people changed their initial answers after having unrestricted time to engage in analytic processing.…”

Predicting individual differences in conflict detection and bias susceptibility during reasoning

“…Further, the likelihood of conflict detection and subsequent engagement in analytic type 2 processing has been thought to be determined by the relative strength of the logical and heuristic intuition. Specifically, it is assumed that conflict detection likelihood will be maximal when the strength of the two intuitively cued outputs is maximally similar (Bago & De Neys, 2019a;De Neys & Pennycook, 2019;Pennycook et al, 2015). However, as for most biased reasoners the heuristic intuition will be typically stronger than the logical one, correct responding on conflict reasoning tasks for them will require the analytic type 2 processing to override the dominant heuristic intuition.…”

“…More specifically, given that the conflict detection likelihood is assumed to depend on the relative strength of one's heuristic and/or logical intuitions (Pennycook et al, 2015;Bago & De Neys, 2019a;De Neys & Pennycook, 2019), these relative strengths might show much more variability across different reasoning tasks and/or even across different item contents of a single task. As is clear from the traditional group and individual-level conflict detection analyses both in the present study and in previous works (e.g., Frey & De Neys, 2017;, there is quite some variability in detection effects observed across different tasks.…”

“…Given the conflict detection findings, it appeared that people are quickly and effortlessly processing the logical structure of reasoning tasks to detect that their intuition is in conflict with it (De Neys, 2012, 2013, 2017. As these results were not a priori predicted by traditional default-interventionist models (e.g., Evans & Stanovich, 2013;Kahneman, 2011;Stanovich & West, 2008), several authors more recently moved on to advocate so-called hybrid dual process models (Bago & De Neys, 2019a;De Neys & Pennycook, 2019;Pennycook, et al, 2015;Thompson & Newman, 2017). While the details of these accounts may differ, they all share the core idea that when people face conflict reasoning tasks, they quickly generate several intuitive responses based on heuristics as well as the logical structure of the problem.…”

What does the cognitive reflection test really measure: A process dissociation investigation.

“…More recently, a "hybrid" account incorporates elements from both serial and parallel models (Bago & De Neys, 2019a). Specifically, evidence suggests that some elements of deliberative responding appear to be present from the beginning of the reasoning process: whether or not the conclusion is believable often influences intuitive responses from the start (Handley, Newstead, & Trippas, 2011;Newman, Gibb & Thompson, 2017;.…”