Actively Open-Minded Thinking, Bullshit Receptivity, and Susceptibility to Framing

Rachev, Nikolay R.; Geiger, Sandra J.; Vintr, Jáchym; Kirilova, Desislava; Nabutovsky, Anna; Nelsson, Joakim

doi:10.1027/1015-5759/a000685

Cited by 3 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 42 publications

(79 reference statements)

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“…Neither AOT nor NFC correlated significantly with the number of frame-consistent choices. However, other studies showed statistically significant (p < 0.05) correlations between a measure of frame-(in)consistent choices and cognitive-styles (i.e., AOT, NFC; see e.g., Björklund and Bäckström, 2008;West et al, 2008;Peng et al, 2019;Erceg et al, 2022;Rachev et al, 2022), contradicting our results. According to the classification by Cohen (1988), these correlations are small to moderate.…”

Section: Summary and Discussioncontrasting

confidence: 99%

“…The findings are in line with Mandel and Kapler ( 2018 ), who found no moderating effect of need for cognition (equivalent to rational thinking-style) and actively open-minded thinking on a similarly narrow interpretation of framing effects. However, other studies showed small (according to the classification of Cohen, 1988 ) but significant positive correlations suggesting the number of FIC to decrease with increasing scores of rational (LeBoeuf and Shafir, 2003 ; Björklund and Bäckström, 2008 ; Peng et al, 2019 ) and actively open-minded thinking-style (West et al, 2008 ; Erceg et al, 2022 ; Rachev et al, 2022 ). Note that the relationships between FIC (or a similar measure) and experiential thinking-style, and between FIC and stimulating-instrumental risk-styles have not been investigated so far.…”

Section: General Discussion and Conclusionmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Individual differences have been linked to framing susceptibility but the results are mixed. Some studies indicated that individual differences in intuitive-deliberative cognitive-styles and risk-styles moderate framing effects in the expected way (NFC: e.g., LeBoeuf and Shafir, 2003 ; Simon et al, 2004 ; Björklund and Bäckström, 2008 ; Peng et al, 2019 ; AOT: e.g., West et al, 2008 ; Erceg et al, 2022 ; Rachev et al, 2022 ), and other research, however, failed to identify a significant relationship (NFC: e.g., Corbin, 2015 ; Fatmawati, 2015 ; Stark et al, 2017 ; Mandel and Kapler, 2018 ; FI: e.g., Levin et al, 2002 ; Shiloh et al, 2002 ; Björklund and Bäckström, 2008 ; Stark et al, 2017 ; AOT: e.g., Erceg et al, 2022 , study 2; Mandel and Kapler, 2018 ; SIRI: e.g., Mahoney et al, 2011 ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In particular, several interpretations of framing effects have been used. Peng et al ( 2019 ) and Rachev et al ( 2022 ) used the “resistance to framing” component of the Adult Decision Making Competence (ADMC) scale (Bruine de Bruin et al, 2007 ). This involves one unusual disease-like decision problem framed as gain or loss.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Finally, the study design may not have been optimal in several cases. While some studies varied the framing manipulation within participants (e.g., Levin et al, 2002 ; Mahoney et al, 2011 ; Peng et al, 2019 ; Erceg et al, 2022 ; Rachev et al, 2022 ), other studies relied on between-subjects designs where a particular decision problem is described by different frames and each participant responds to only one of these frames (Shiloh et al, 2002 ; Simon et al, 2004 ; Björklund and Bäckström, 2008 ; Fatmawati, 2015 ; Stark et al, 2017 ; Mandel and Kapler, 2018 ). However, several researchers pointed out that a within-subjects design is more appropriate when investigating framing effects on the individual level (Frisch, 1993 ; Baron, 2010 ; Appelt et al, 2011 ; Mahoney et al, 2011 ; Aczel et al, 2018 ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Individual differences moderate effects in an Unusual Disease paradigm: A psychophysical data collection lab approach and an online experiment

Wyszynski,

Diederich

2023

Front. Psychol.

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We report two studies investigating individual intuitive-deliberative cognitive-styles and risk-styles as moderators of the framing effect in Tversky and Kahneman's famous Unusual Disease problem setting. We examined framing effects in two ways: counting the number of frame-inconsistent choices and comparing the proportions of risky choices depending on gain-loss framing. Moreover, in addition to gain-loss frames, we systematically varied the number of affected people, probabilities of surviving/dying, type of disease, and response deadlines. Study 1 used a psychophysical data collection approach and a sample of 43 undergraduate students, each performing 480 trials. Study 2 was an online study incorporating psychophysical elements in a social science approach using a larger and more heterogeneous sample, i.e., 262 participants performed 80 trials each. In both studies, the effect of framing on risky choice proportions was moderated by risk-styles. Cognitive-styles measured on different scales moderated the framing effect only in study 2. The effects of disease type, probability of surviving/dying, and number of affected people on risky choice frequencies were also affected by cognitive-styles and risk-styles but different for both studies and to different extents. We found no relationship between the number of frame-inconsistent choices and cognitive-styles or risk-styles, respectively.

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Actively Open-Minded Thinking, Bullshit Receptivity, and Susceptibility to Framing

Cited by 3 publications

References 42 publications

Individual differences moderate effects in an Unusual Disease paradigm: A psychophysical data collection lab approach and an online experiment

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