ActionScript bytecode verification with co-logic programming

Abstract

A prototype security policy verification system for ActionScript binaries is presented, whose implementation leverages recent advances in co-logic programming. Our experience with co-logic programming indicates that it is an extremely useful paradigm for elegantly expressing algorithms that lie at the heart of model-checking technologies. This results in an unusually small trusted computing base, making the verification system well-suited to frameworks like certifying in-lined reference monitoring systems, which require small, light-weight verifiers. Preliminary experiments and progress are discussed.

Aspect-oriented in-lined reference monitors

“…For example, CodeSurfer/x86 and WPDS++ have been used to extract and check models for x86 binary programs [3]. In prior work [9], we have presented a general model-checking system for ActionScript bytecode implemented using co-logic programming [19]. This paper extends that work by introducing new formalisms specific to the verification of safety policies enforced by IRM's.…”

“…Once the raw bytecode is extracted, a Definite Clause Grammar (DCG) [18] parser converts it to an annotated abstract syntax tree (AST) for easy analysis and manipulation. We implemented this parser in Prolog so that the same code functions as a code generator due to the reversible nature of Prolog predicates [9]. Modified AST's produced by the rewriter are thereby transformed back into bytecode, and the ABC Injector reconstructs a modified SWF file by packaging the new code with the original data.…”

Hippocratic binary instrumentation: First do no harm

“…Though its bytecode language is type-safe, past malware has exploited VM buffer overflows [37], implemented cross-site-scripting attacks, and performed click-jacking [38,39] to damage browsers or disrupt victim host pages. The difficulty of enforcing rich AS security policies that prevent such attacks in web environments that are aggressively heterogeneous (e.g., composed of mash-ups that mix mobile code from many mutually distrusting sources) has led to application of IRM technologies to this challenging problem domain [9,[25][26][27][28]40].…”

Third Party Data Protection Applied To Cloud and Xacml Implementation in the Hadoop Environment With Sparql

“…Our proposed binary-rewriter implementation will be based on SPoX (Security Policy XML) (Hamlen, 2008), which we developed to enforce declarative, XML-based, IRM policies for Java byte code programs. In order to provide strong security guarantees for our system, we will apply automated software verification technologies, including type and model-checking, which we have previously used to certify the output of binary-rewriters (Hamlen, 2006;DeVries, 2009). Such certification allows a small, trusted verifier to independently prove that rewritten binary code satisfies the original security policy, thereby shifting the comparatively larger binaryrewriter out of the trusted computing base of the system…”