Academic directors in board and corporate expropriation: Evidence from China

Khidmat, Waqas Bin; Khan, Haroon ur Rashid; Habib, Muhammad Danish; Awan, Sadia

doi:10.1002/mde.3388

Cited by 8 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 85 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Reputed directors enhances the overall value of firm (Okpamen and Ogbeide, 2020). The previous studies on the directors having academic position have shown that they curtail the managerial expropriations (Khan et al, 2022) and enhance the corporate philanthropy (Cho et al, 2017). Academics can collaborate with different stakeholders and act as catalyst in an organization networking, both internal and external.…”

Section: F7mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

How do Independent Directors View Carbon Information Disclosure? Evidence From China

Khan

Khidmat

Awan

et al. 2022

Front. Environ. Sci.

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This study examines the effect of independent directors on carbon information disclosure (CID) in China from 2011 to 2017. Additionally, this study investigates the effect of independent director’s attributes (gender, academic experience, and political connection) on the CID. To test our hypothesis, we collected data of 511 Chinese listed firms. The empirical results show that independent directors have a positive influence on the CID. Moreover, the independent female directors, independent academic directors and independent politically connected directors also enhances the CID. Our findings offer shareholders, regulators, and other stakeholders an integrating perspective on motivating firms to disclose high quality carbon information.

show abstract

Section: F7mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Literature has identified the role of academics in corporate policies (Wang, 2020;Huang and Teklay, 2021;Khan et al, 2022). We propose that the independent academic directors can enhance the CID based on upper echelons theory.…”

Section: Independent Directorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How do Independent Directors View Carbon Information Disclosure? Evidence From China

Khan

Khidmat

Awan

et al. 2022

Front. Environ. Sci.

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…State ownership can leverage the advantages of human resources and other resources (Zhu et al, 2005). Khan et al (2022) observed that the presence of the academic director on the board mitigates earnings management and abnormal investments and enhances dividend payments and the critical mass of academic directors curbs the expropriator managerial behavior of Chinese listed firms. Liu, Wang, and Zhu (2021) thought the education level of the CEO was positively related to platform survival probability, but the effects of the CEO's education and experience were less significant for state‐owned platforms.…”

Section: Evolution Of Opinions On the Soermentioning

confidence: 99%

“… Khan et al (2022). observed that the presence of the academic director on the board mitigates earnings…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

State ownership may not be bad: Based on bibliometric research (2002–2021)

Chen

2022

Manage Decis Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Over the past two decades, the world's view of the state‐owned enterprise reform (SOER) has shifted. Based on the WOS database and CiteSpace, this study analyzes the SOER from seven dimensions and reveals that the SOER is heating up and closer to co‐research. China and the United States have become important research centers, and Chinese state‐owned enterprises have become the main research objects. Moreover, this study finds that the concept of the SOER has changed rapidly after 2012 and supports state ownership in five aspects: economic drive, resource access, innovation promotion, social responsibility enhancements, and state governance.

show abstract

“…Yet, while a chief executive officer (CEO) is hired to improve management efficiency, various agency problems may arise as a result of the conflict of interests between the manager's self‐interests and those of the shareholders who are concerned with enhancing firm value (Abdoh & Liu, 2021; Chen et al, 2022; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In order to mitigate the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders, prior researchers have provided a number of control mechanisms, such as supervision by external shareholders (e.g., Ali & Zhang, 2015; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985), supervision by the board of directors (e.g., Ding et al, 2010; Khan et al, 2022), and managerial compensation plans (e.g., Bettis et al, 2018; Huang et al, 2022; Lin et al, 2012). Prior researches have evidenced that there exists an explicitly linkage between managerial compensation and various performance measure indexes (e.g., Canace et al, 2022).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

R&D expenditures and CEO compensation policy: The effect of corporate control and market competition on managerial opportunism

Wang

Chen

2023

Manage Decis Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

China and Taiwan (so‐called Greater China) are representative of two of the fastest‐growing economies in the Pacific Rim region. This study uses Taiwanese high‐tech firms as sample and explores whether boards of directors attempt to avoid opportunistic reductions in research and development (R&D) investments by CEOs. This study considers a scenario in which high‐tech firms face a small earnings decline or a small loss but their CEOs could opportunistically cut R&D investments to improve financial results. The focus of this study is to examine how corporate control (whether or not a firm is controlled by a family) and market competition affect the relationship between R&D investments and CEO compensation schemes. Overall, we find that the stock‐based incentive compensation is more effective than the cash compensation in deterring managerial opportunism. In non‐family firms, we find there exists a positive significant relationship between changes in R&D expenditures and changes in CEO stock‐based compensation when a firm is faced with a small earnings decline or a small loss. Specifically, compared to family firms, the boards of directors of non‐family firms face more severe agency problems (as a result of the separation of ownership and control) and therefore tend to significantly adjust the incentive components in CEO compensation schemes to deter managerial opportunism. Regarding the effect of market competition, we find that incentives to adjust compensation plan to remove CEOs from opportunistically reducing discretionary R&D investments are greater in firms facing more intense market competition.

show abstract

Academic directors in board and corporate expropriation: Evidence from China

Cited by 8 publications

References 85 publications

How do Independent Directors View Carbon Information Disclosure? Evidence From China

How do Independent Directors View Carbon Information Disclosure? Evidence From China

State ownership may not be bad: Based on bibliometric research (2002–2021)

R&D expenditures and CEO compensation policy: The effect of corporate control and market competition on managerial opportunism

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About