A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics

Abstract

We propose a theory of political parties in which interest groups and activists are the key actors, and coalitions of groups develop common agendas and screen candidates for party nominations based on loyalty to their agendas. This theoretical stance contrasts with currently dominant theories, which view parties as controlled by election-minded politicians. The difference is normatively important because parties dominated by interest groups and activists are less responsive to voter preferences, even to the point of taking advantage of lapses in voter attention to politics. Our view is consistent with evidence from the formation of national parties in the 1790s, party position change on civil rights and abortion, patterns of polarization in Congress, policy design and nominations for state legislatures, Congress, and the presidency.

Why Aren't There More Republican Women in Congress? Gender, Partisanship, and Fundraising Support in the 2010 and 2012 Elections

“…If there are differences in the levels of access that We expect that relative to their male partisan counterparts, Democratic women will be more successful fundraisers than Republican women, enjoying greater access to the networks of donors that support their party's candidates. Recent research on political parties demonstrates that parties are networks of activists and interest groups working to recruit and elect candidates who will be committed to a common party agenda (Bawn et al 2012). Thus, candidates must create a profile that will attract a partisan donor pool that is particularly focused on the candidate's issue positions.…”

Evidence of a winning-cohesion tradeoff under multi-winner ranked-choice voting

“…In the presidencycentered narrative of Bawn et al (2012), interest groups paper over their differences in order to elect a chosen candidate. Inaction on points of disagreement is a source of disunity, and it causes realignment in the long term (Miller and Schofield 2003;Karol 2009).…”

Competing for the platform

“…More recent research re-conceptualizes this framework by acknowledging that political parties are ultimately, at least in part, comprised of organized interests (Bawn et al 2012;Cohen et al 2008;Karol 2009;Noel 2014). In this view parties are loose coalitions of intense policy demanders who seek some common goal (Masket 2016).…”

“…Whether resulting in policy change or not, the interaction captures the behavior of 'intense policy demanders' (Bawn et al, 2012;Cohen et al 2008), those who have a strong preference for particular policy outcomes and, in this case, influence over platform creation.…”