A Theory of Legal Obligation

Bertea, Stefano

doi:10.1017/9781108566216

Cited by 12 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…From a normative perspective, they suggest that the values articulated in that part of the Treaty 'should inform policy-makers about the outer boundaries of policy formulation and implementation', since 'even if actors cooperate sincerely and respect the limits of their proper competences this does not automatically result in coherent policy outcomes'. 30 Bertea's observation that 'what is coherent forms a rational unit rather than a chaotic assemblage of possibly inconsistent normative statements' resonates here too; 31 though it should be remembered that chaos can stem from 'contradictions and overlapping'. 32 Thus while the idea of using Articles 2 and 3 TEU to cut through ambiguity regarding the values that should guide Union action, the problem is that those provisions themselves express attachment to so many values as to render any formal sense of instruction that they could provide ultimately futile.…”

Section: A Legal Charactermentioning

confidence: 86%

Deconstructing and reconstructing Article 7 TFEU

Shuibhne¹

2018

The EU and the Proliferation of Integration Principles Under the Lisbon Treaty

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See e.g. CNK Franklin, 'The burgeoning principle of consistency in EU law' (2011) 30 Yearbook of European Law 42, 59; confirming that this includes the Court of Justice, see Thomas Horsley, 'Reflections on the role of the Court of Justice as the "motor" of European integration: legal limits to judicial lawmaking' (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 931, 949-950. 2 See Article III-115 of the adopted version (2004 OJ C310/1); like Article 7 TFEU, the provision was the first of those 'of general application' in Part III of this Treaty (i.e. covering 'the policies and functioning of the Union').

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Section: A Legal Charactermentioning

confidence: 86%

Deconstructing and reconstructing Article 7 TFEU

Shuibhne¹

2018

The EU and the Proliferation of Integration Principles Under the Lisbon Treaty

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“…1 Recientes contribuciones sobre la obligatoriedad del derecho, incluye la obra de Stefano Bertea (Bertea, 2019). Nótese que mi rechazo a la idea de inferir un concepto de obligatoriedad a partir de la teoría de la acción de Anscombe y de la razón práctica tiene su raíz Comparto con Scavuzzo la idea de que la práctica social es fundamental para comprender el punto de vista interno, o más bien, lo que yo llamo el punto de vista de quien delibera o el de la primera persona.…”

Section: Respuestas a Las Críticas Formuladas Por Natalia Scavuzzounclassified

Enfrentándome a mí misma: réplicas a Natalia Scavuzzo, Alejandro Guevara Arroyo y Ezequiel Monti

Rodríguez-Blanco

2021

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En este ensayo, respondo a una serie de comentarios y críticas a mi artículo “Rastreando las críticas de Finnis al punto de vista interno de Hart: inestabilidad y el ‘sentido y propósito’ de la acción humana en el derecho” formulados por Natalia Scavuzzo, Ezequiel Monti y Alejandro Guevara Arroyo. Los autores discuten y formulan preguntas importantes en relación a la naturaleza y carácter de la acción humana y la metodología de la filosofía del derecho.

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“…Therefore, including or excluding an 'item' in the abductive 66 From this point of view, all analytical and procedural theories of legal justification and/or reasoning which are based on hierarchical as well as systemic/functional semantics seem to me unable to immunize themselves from the cognitive transmuting inherent in all the descriptive categories that legal language needs to involve in its statements. For an interesting and critical overview of the huge literature on this topic see [5,6]; with specific regard to the analytical legal approach, see above. I would like to emphasize that the cognitive motility tied to the descriptive parts of legal statements assumes crucial relevance when legal cases involve cultural differences.…”

Section: How the Limits To The 'Limits Of Law' Make Legal Semantic Resources Mobilementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Consider, thus, the following passages of Greimas' essay titled, 'Semiotic Analysis of a Legal Discourse. The Trade Act on Corporations and Company Groups' (1976) 6 :…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Conversely, from a prospective internal to religious law, and more broadly to the religious domain, any limit is to be considered as a self-limitation, and then an expression of the all-comprehensive cosmological and cognitive approach connotative of the majority of world religions. 6 The original title of the essay was: Analyse sémiotique d'un discours juridique [40]. The translation of the following passages is mine.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Perpetually Astride Eden’s Boundaries: The Limits to the ‘Limits of Law’ and the Semiotic Inconsistency of ‘Legal Enclosures’

Ricca

2020

Int J Semiot Law

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Legal systems can be metaphorically taken as semantic and pragmatic enclosures. The ancient world has given us at least three literary loci that display the self-disruptive significance of this kind of metaphor if assumed as a practical guideline in the attempt to steer human experience. The first such loci can be traced in biblical Eden; the second one in the Phaeacian garden described in Homer’s Odyssey; the third in the stories of the first and second mythical Athens included in Plato’s Timaeus and Republic. In all these tales, human beings ineluctably end up straying across the semantic-spatial borders which certain categories and rules have given them to encompass their experience. All these literary loci offer both a semio-cognitive and a constitutional lesson for lawyers and sovereigns. My intention is to exploit these lessons to show that the most relevant limit of legal systems, if taken as semantic and pragmatic enclosures, consists precisely in their inability to constitutively limit themselves and their semiotic borders. This inaptitude is due, in my view, to the semiotic ‘exceedance’ of the phrastic, or descriptive parts of legal rules even more than the semantic vagueness of the values underlying their legitimacy. Any attempt to define the semantic and spatial boundaries of human experience by means of verbal enunciations implies the use of categorical schemes to define the legitimate and/or forbidden behaviors. But categorical schemes, in turn, comprise boundaries that draw protean verges between the inside and the outside of each category. The categorical ‘inside’ compellingly tends to exceed its borders so as to protrude out toward what is outside the category. In turn, the ‘outside’ shows, more often than not, continuities with the axiological/teleological patterns underpinning the semantic boundaries of legal rules. Any attempt to limit the competence/extension of law, if taken in its semantic/spatial significance, would seem to unveil what law could or should be, but is not. Relying on the above literary loci, I will try to demonstrate that this apparently contradictory implication is inherent in the dialectic between equality/universality and difference/plurality that makes up categorization itself, and thereby the semiotic prerequisites to considering any legal rule.

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A Theory of Legal Obligation

Cited by 12 publications

References 193 publications

Deconstructing and reconstructing Article 7 TFEU

Deconstructing and reconstructing Article 7 TFEU

Enfrentándome a mí misma: réplicas a Natalia Scavuzzo, Alejandro Guevara Arroyo y Ezequiel Monti

Perpetually Astride Eden’s Boundaries: The Limits to the ‘Limits of Law’ and the Semiotic Inconsistency of ‘Legal Enclosures’

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