Ifs 1980
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-9117-0_14
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Cited by 437 publications
(354 citation statements)
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“…So, there is nothing in the story to change this." thus we run into issues about the Principal Principle, the relation between objective and subjective probabilities, and the hidden ways of admissible and inadmissible information in the sense of Lewis (1980). However, this is a red herring, for both sides.…”
Section: Third Application: Sleeping Beautymentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…So, there is nothing in the story to change this." thus we run into issues about the Principal Principle, the relation between objective and subjective probabilities, and the hidden ways of admissible and inadmissible information in the sense of Lewis (1980). However, this is a red herring, for both sides.…”
Section: Third Application: Sleeping Beautymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, Lewis (2001), who triggered the entire debate by contradicting Elga (2000), turns the tables and states that precisely because of this argument its premise P Mo (H) = 1/2 must be wrong. His suggestion, as elaborated by Bradley (2011: 403-406), is this: In assuming P Mo (H) = 1/2 Elga (2000: 145) apparently relies on the Principal Principle according to which your credence for H should agree with the chance of H-provided, Lewis warns, the information one has in P Mo is admissible in the sense of Lewis (1980). and Bradley argues that it is indeed inadmissible: if the information that now is tuesday is inadmissible, as it clearly is, then the information that now is monday must be inadmissible as well.…”
Section: Third Application: Sleeping Beautymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There are various ways to formulate causal decision theory, but, like Skyrms (1980;1984) and Lewis (1981), I think that the most plausible formulations are those in terms of chance. 5 If we assume that agents are always rationally certain that each of their options has a nonzero present chance of being chosen (as I will, hereafter), then we can formulate causal decision theory in terms of conditional chance.…”
Section: The Rule Of U-maximizationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…According to David Lewis's 'Principal Principle' rational degrees of belief are expectations of objective chances, at least when objective chances are known to exist. 22 It tells us to align degrees of belief with chances. The result of a toss of a fair coin is a matter of objective chance.…”
Section: Second Objectionmentioning
confidence: 99%