A stochastic assessment to quantify the risk of introduction of African swine fever virus to Taiwan via illegal pork products carried by international travellers

Abstract

The current study quantified the risk of releasing African swine fever virus (ASFV) into Taiwan from pork products illegally carried by international travellers from 157 countries or territories through six international airports and three international seaports.The association between various factors and the number of pork products detected by the border control authorities was also examined. The risk was estimated with a stochastic process after modelling the number of undetected illegal pork products, probability of pork product detection at international airports and seaports and probability of ASFV contamination of pork products from various countries. The overall annual probability of ASFV release to Taiwan was estimated to be 1 [95% confidence interval (CI): 1-1] under no enhanced mitigation measures. All the median airport-level risks were higher than .921, and four of them reached 1. The total annual risk was .570

Strategies for Transboundary Swine Disease Management in Asian Islands: Foot and Mouth Disease, Classical Swine Fever, and African Swine Fever in Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines

“…In Taiwan and Japan, the primary risk of ASF introduction is associated with border control inspections, as studies indicate ASFV can be detected in pork products brought by travelers [ 37 , 38 , 39 , 40 ]. Empirical evidence from Taiwan reveals a notable increase in the detection of illegal pork products carried by international travelers, particularly peaking in January and February [ 39 ].…”

“…In Taiwan and Japan, the primary risk of ASF introduction is associated with border control inspections, as studies indicate ASFV can be detected in pork products brought by travelers [ 37 , 38 , 39 , 40 ]. Empirical evidence from Taiwan reveals a notable increase in the detection of illegal pork products carried by international travelers, particularly peaking in January and February [ 39 ]. Despite pigs in domestic farms testing negative for ASF in both Taiwan and Japan, a persistent threat arises from travelers transporting pork-related products that may harbor ASFV.…”

“…The challenges encountered in controlling ASF in the country include a shortage of trained manpower, the intricacies of the swine value chain (lack of traceability), and the persistence of high-risk practices in specific farming sectors and live animal trade [36]. In Taiwan and Japan, the primary risk of ASF introduction is associated with border control inspections, as studies indicate ASFV can be detected in pork products brought by travelers [37][38][39][40]. Empirical evidence from Taiwan reveals a notable increase in the detection of illegal pork products carried by international travelers, particularly peaking in January and February [39].…”

What can we learn from the five-year African swine fever epidemic in Asia?

“…In Japan, ASF-contaminated pork products are frequently detected at international ports, and the risk of ASF entry is estimated to be high ( 39 ). Similarly, quantitative risk assessment studies conducted in Taiwan have shown a very high risk of ASFV introduction ( 40 ). A dead pig that washed ashore in the territory was recorded as an ASF-positive individual in the EMPRES-i database ( 7 , 40 ).…”

“…Similarly, quantitative risk assessment studies conducted in Taiwan have shown a very high risk of ASFV introduction ( 40 ). A dead pig that washed ashore in the territory was recorded as an ASF-positive individual in the EMPRES-i database ( 7 , 40 ).…”