A Smart Market for Impervious Cover

Abstract

When farmland or undeveloped ground is covered over, runoff can cause environmental damage and flood risk. Policymakers want to compare the economic improvement of new development to the costs produced by the associated environmental impacts. In this paper, we propose a smart market in impervious cover. A smart market is a periodic auction which is cleared by an optimization model, a linear program (LP) in this case. The LP constraint coefficients come from a hydrological model. The LP objective coefficients come from users' bids. To operate the auction, local government would appoint an auction manager, who would be responsible for maintaining the hydrological model and the LP, for operating the auction, and for maintaining the desired environmental standards. At regular intervals, the auction manager would accept bids over the internet, solve the corresponding LP, and announce the results. By LP duality, the smart market prices impervious cover at the opportunity cost to society, adjusted for location, the sensitivity of environmental features, and the incremental value of the development as indicated by bids. This design uses relevant hydrological information, and accepts community input on the desired environmental standards (avoiding the tragedy of the commons). The auction creates incentives to remove impervious cover, especially near environmentally sensitive areas. The proposed system nearly eliminates transaction costs associated with trading development rights.

Proposed Smart Market Design for Sediment Discharge

“…A smart market for impervious cover was proposed by Raffensperger and Cochrane (2010). They developed a market design for controlling runoff near environmentally sensitive areas.…”

“…So the manager may wish to encourage participant participation (Shortle and Horan 2001;Shortle and Horan 2008). Raffensperger and Cochrane (2010) noted that the implementation of a renewal system would incentivise participation. The manager could annul some or all rights at regular intervals, and require land owners to re-purchase the allowances.…”

Simulating water markets with transaction costs

“…“Agent” in this context refers to water users and in some cases a wider array of actors including institutional ones. Recent efforts in modeling innovative water market structures also include auction‐based systems (smart markets), where each user trades with the auction manager [ Raffensperger and Cochrane , ; Schreinemachers and Berger , ].…”