A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations

Walker, Mark

doi:10.2307/1911126

Cited by 183 publications

(95 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Although Samuelson's (1954) view of this problem was pessimistic, Groves and Ledyard (1977) show that efficient public goods provision can be achieved in Nash equilibrium. Although the Groves-Ledyard mechanism does not satisfy individual rationality, Hurwicz (1979) and Walker (1981) show that the Lindahl mechanism is implementable. Subsequently, numerous mechanisms have been proposed to improve the properties of mechanisms.…”

Section: Related Literature On Public Goods Provisionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contributing or Free-Riding? A Theory of Endogenous Lobby Formation

Furusawa

Konishi

2008

SSRN Journal

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We consider a two-stage public goods provision game. In the first stage, players simultaneously decide if they join a contribution group. Then in the second stage, players in the contribution group simultaneously offer contribution schedules to influence the government's decision on the public good provision. Using perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston, 1987 JET), we show that the set of equilibrium outcomes is equivalent to an "intuitive" hybrid solution concept, the freeriding-proof core, which is always nonempty but does not necessarily achieve global efficiency. It is not necessarily true that an equilibrium contribution group is formed by the players with the highest willingness-to-pay, nor is it true that group members are consecutive with respect to their willingness-to-pay. We also show that the equilibrium level of public good shrinks to zero as the economy is replicated in a certain way.

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Section: Related Literature On Public Goods Provisionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contributing or Free-Riding? A Theory of Endogenous Lobby Formation

Furusawa

Konishi

2008

SSRN Journal

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“…First, the set of alternatives considered is the set of lotteries over the set A, and second, the designer will content herself with approximately implementing her SCR, instead of implementing it exactly. 30 One can easily 29 Indeed, apart from the canonical mechanism of the proof of Proposition 7, mechanisms tailored to the Walrasian SCR for private and public goods have been proposed in Hurwicz (1979), Schmeidler (1980), Walker (1981), Dutta, Sen and Vohra (1995).…”

Section: Virtual Implementation In Nash Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 99%

The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules

Serrano¹

2004

SIAM Rev.

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract. Suppose that the goals of a society can be summarized in a social choice rule, i.e., a mapping from relevant underlying parameters to final outcomes. Typically, the underlying parameters (e.g., individual preferences) are private information to the agents in society. The implementation problem is then formulated: under what circumstances can one design a mechanism so that the private information is truthfully elicited and the social optimum ends up being implemented? In designing such a mechanism, appropriate incentives will have to be given to the agents so that they do not wish to misrepresent their information. The theory of implementation or mechanism design formalizes this "social engineering" problem and provides answers to the question just posed. I survey the theory of implementation in this article, emphasizing the results based on two behavioral assumptions for the agents (dominant strategies and Nash equilibrium). Examples discussed include voting, and the allocation of private and public goods under complete and incomplete information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification: C72, D78, D82. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

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“…Since the introduction of fines enhances the observed effectiveness, this suggests that there is room for improvement to the modified canonical mechanism. 1 Chen and Tang (1998) conduct a comparative study of the basic quadratic mechanism of Groves and Ledyard (1977) and the paired-difference mechanism by Walker (1981). Elbittar and Kagel (1997) compare the performance of Moore's (1992) and Perry and Reny's (1999) mechanisms to implement the efficient allocation of an indivisible private good among two players (King Solomon's Dilemma).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An experiment on Nash implementation

Cabrales¹,

Charness²,

Corchón³

2003

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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We perform an experimental test of a modification of the controversial canonical mechanism for Nash implementation, using three subjects in non-repeated groups, as well as three outcomes, states of nature, and integer choices. We find that this mechanism successfully implements the desired outcome a large majority of the time, providing empirical evidence for the feasibility of such implementation. In addition, the performance is further improved by imposing a fine on a dissident, so that the mechanism implements strict Nash equilibria. While our environment is stylized, our results offer hope that experiments can identify reasonable features for practical implementation mechanisms.

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A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations

Cited by 183 publications

References 7 publications

Contributing or Free-Riding? A Theory of Endogenous Lobby Formation

Contributing or Free-Riding? A Theory of Endogenous Lobby Formation

The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules

An experiment on Nash implementation

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