A routing defense mechanism using evolutionary game theory for Delay Tolerant Networks

Guo, Hang; Wang, Xingwei; Cheng, Hui; Huang, Min

doi:10.1016/j.asoc.2015.10.019

Cited by 35 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 21 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The population system then converged and used defensive strategies against the malicious node in order to oblige it to cooperate. Compared with previous studies [12][13][14], in which the system performance could not guarantee that each node can achieve the best benefit, the node is still likely to appear to exhibit selfish behavior. Also, the system is unable to complete an accurate description of the dynamic evolution of the node strategy, preventing the determination of the robustness and stability of these mechanisms due to the lack of analysis based on strict mathematical theories.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 65%

“…Alskaif et al [12] conducted a survey of game theory to balance wireless sensor networks and provide the required service, while achieving a trade-off between providing the required lifetime and maximizing the lifetime of a network. Guo et al [13] recommended against various routing attacks on DTNs; the network can reach evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) under special conditions after meeting the evolutionary requirements in the context of DTNs. Evolutionary game theory-based defense schemes can achieve an average delivery ratio, low average transmission delay, and low network overhead in various routing attack scenarios.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Therefore, the present incentive model has the following disadvantages [12][13][14]: (1) with y being the current mechanism, determining the robustness and stability of these mechanisms is impossible due to the lack of analysis when applying strict mathematical theories; (2) the current mechanism enhances the performance of the system, so it can achieve its best performance, but it cannot guarantee that each node can or will achieve the best benefit, so the nodes are still likely to exhibit selfish behaviors; (3) the current model forwarded packets well while resisting any slight variations. However, Energies 2018, 11, 1281 3 of 16 the disadvantage is that this model used higher power; it was too late to initiate defensive measures due to the limited ability of power consumption for the defense to compute the nodes [15].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

An Active Defense Model with Low Power Consumption and Deviation for Wireless Sensor Networks Utilizing Evolutionary Game Theory

2018

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In wireless sensors networks, nodes may be easily captured and act non-cooperatively, for example by not defending forwarding packets in response to their own limited resources. If most of these nodes are obtained by attackers, and an attack by an internal malicious node occurs, the entire network will be paralyzed and not be able to provide normal service. Low power consumption indicates that the rational sensor nodes tend to be very close to the mean; high power consumption indicates that the rational sensor nodes are spread out over a large range of values. This paper offers an active defense model for wireless sensor networks based on evolutionary game theory. We use evolutionary game theory to analyze the reliability and stability of a wireless sensor network with malicious nodes. Adding a defense model into the strategy space of the rational nodes and establishing a preventive mechanism forces the malicious node to abandon the attack and even switch to cooperative strategies. Thus, this paper argues that the stability and reliability of wireless sensor networks can be improved. Numerical experiments were conducted to evaluate the proposed defense model, and these results verified our conclusions based on a theoretical analysis that showed that, compared with the existing algorithms, our approach has lower energy consumption, lower deviation, and a higher probability to quickly switch each node to cooperative strategies.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 65%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

An Active Defense Model with Low Power Consumption and Deviation for Wireless Sensor Networks Utilizing Evolutionary Game Theory

2018

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Several secured routing protocols for Oppnets have been proposed in the literature. Representative ones are listed in the reference list (see previous studies [11][12][13][14][15][16][17] ). The tabular representation of secure routing protocols of opportunistic networks are represented in Table 1.…”

Section: Secure Routing Protocols Of Opportunistic Networkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Message trust‐based secure multipath routing protocol for opportunistic networks

Dhurandher

Singh

Woungang

et al. 2020

Int J Communication

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Summary Opportunistic networks (OppNets) are composed of wireless nodes opportunistically communicating with each other. These networks are designed to operate in a challenging environment characterized by high delay, intermittent connectivity, and no guarantee of fixed path between the sender and the destination nodes. One of the most vital issues in designing and maintaining practical networks over a time period is the security of the messages flowing in OppNets. This paper proposes a new method called message trust‐based secure multipath routing protocol (MT‐SMRP) for opportunistic networks. Various routing protocols such as ProPHet, Epidemic, and HiBOp, to name a few, have been proposed for OppNets, but none of these have applied a secure multipath routing technique. The proposed MT‐SMRP scheme relays the message to the destination through the disjoint paths, each applying a soft‐encryption technique to prevent message fabrication attacks. Simulations are conducted using the Haggle Infocom'06 real mobility data traces, showing that when time‐to‐live is varied, (1) the proposed MT‐SMRP scheme outperforms D‐MUST by 18.10%, 7.55%, 3.275%, respectively, in terms of delivery probability, messages dropped, and average latency; (2) it also outperforms SHBPR by 21.30%, 7.44%, and 4.85%, respectively, in terms of delivery probability, messages dropped, and average latency. Under similar performance metrics, the performance of MT‐SMRP is also shown to be better than that of D‐MUST and SHBPR when the buffer size (respondents. the message generation interval) is varied.

show abstract

“…Both of these nodes have limited resources and are given appropriate incentives to choose one of several strategies. Previously, game theory has been used to solve a number of problems occurring in Delay tolerant networks and Opportunistic Networks …”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A fuzzy logic and game theory based adaptive approach for securing opportunistic networks against black hole attacks

Chhabra

Vashishth

Sharma

2017

Int J Communication

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Opportunistic networks (OppNets) are networks that can be used in situations of sparse network connectivity. Strategies for implementing secure transmission of messages in OppNets offer complex and distinctive problems that are wholly different from traditional networks using TCP/IP protocols for data transmission. In this paper, a security protocol named FuzzyPT is proposed which combats black hole attacks in OppNets. The defense mechanism is based on the information extracted from messages in the buffer, potential threat (PT) messages, and fuzzy logic. Fuzziness aids the system in being adaptive by modeling the character of nodes as either benign or malicious. It provides the network with the ability to judge the character of nodes based on relationships between different parameters instead of basing this decision on fixed conditions. FuzzyPT is observed to reduce erroneous decision-making and decrease the number of false positives and false negatives in the system. An evolutionary game theoretic model is applied, which analyzes the decision-making ability of relays in choosing varied strategies while forwarding messages. The evolutionary stable state is computed for the protocol, which verifies the proposition that a majority of the relays will cooperate by forwarding messages. The efficiency of the protocol is judged on various grounds such as delivery probability, network overhead ratio, packets dropped, and transmission latency. It is observed that the proposed game theoretic protocol outperforms an existing acknowledge and evolutionary game theory-based security protocol in terms of all the aforementioned performance characteristics. KEYWORDS ACK, delay tolerant networks, evolutionary game theory, fuzzy logic, opportunistic networks, potential threat mechanism, the opportunistic network environment (ONE) simulator

show abstract

A routing defense mechanism using evolutionary game theory for Delay Tolerant Networks

Cited by 35 publications

References 21 publications

An Active Defense Model with Low Power Consumption and Deviation for Wireless Sensor Networks Utilizing Evolutionary Game Theory

An Active Defense Model with Low Power Consumption and Deviation for Wireless Sensor Networks Utilizing Evolutionary Game Theory

Message trust‐based secure multipath routing protocol for opportunistic networks

A fuzzy logic and game theory based adaptive approach for securing opportunistic networks against black hole attacks

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About