2019
DOI: 10.1590/1678-987319276903
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Abstract: Resumo Introdução: A literatura descreve sistemas proporcionais de lista aberta como centrados em candidatos. Nesse contexto, o papel dos partidos políticos seria pífio. Este trabalho argumenta que, mesmo com constrangimentos institucionais, há espaço para ação estratégica dos partidos na competição eleitoral. Argumenta-se que partidos formam suas listas de candidatos como uma função do distrito eleitoral, garantindo a diminuição ou ausência da competição intrapartidária no território com a regionalização das… Show more

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Cited by 3 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…The combination of individualism and weak political parties seems to imply campaigns focused on candidates, with a high level of intra-party competition (Ames, 1995;Power, 1991). However, recent studies have challenged the view that Brazilian political parties are of little relevance and that intra-party competition is rampant Sin, 2015, 2020;Silotto, 2019;Zucco and Power, 2021). First, although the open-list system reduces the power of parties visà-vis the closed-list system, lists in Brazil are not as open as in other OLPRs, as parties act as gatekeepers, centralizing both the decision on the composition of lists and the allocation of campaign resources (Braga, 2008;Guarnieri, 2004;Meira, 2020;Ribeiro, 2013).…”
Section: Candidate Lists In Brazilmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The combination of individualism and weak political parties seems to imply campaigns focused on candidates, with a high level of intra-party competition (Ames, 1995;Power, 1991). However, recent studies have challenged the view that Brazilian political parties are of little relevance and that intra-party competition is rampant Sin, 2015, 2020;Silotto, 2019;Zucco and Power, 2021). First, although the open-list system reduces the power of parties visà-vis the closed-list system, lists in Brazil are not as open as in other OLPRs, as parties act as gatekeepers, centralizing both the decision on the composition of lists and the allocation of campaign resources (Braga, 2008;Guarnieri, 2004;Meira, 2020;Ribeiro, 2013).…”
Section: Candidate Lists In Brazilmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…First, although the open-list system reduces the power of parties vis-à-vis the closed-list system, lists in Brazil are not as open as in other OLPRs, as parties act as gatekeepers, centralizing both the decision on the composition of lists and the allocation of campaign resources (Braga, 2008; Guarnieri, 2004; Meira, 2020; Ribeiro, 2013). Second, both candidates and parties want to limit internal competition, as candidates do not want to face difficulties in elections, such as disputes for the constituency and for the party’s resources, while the parties want to prevent good candidates from switching to other parties which might offer them better opportunities (Carroll and Nalepa, 2020; Cheibub and Sin, 2015, 2020; Mershon, 2020; Silotto, 2019). Thus, lists are strategically constructed to prevent intra-party competition (Cheibub and Sin, 2015).…”
Section: Olpr List Composition and Candidacy Hierarchymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…28, nº 1, jan.-mar., 2022 129 Do ordenamento legal que autoriza que se lancem mais candidaturas do que a magnitude do distrito, condenada como motor da intensa competição intrapartidária, não se deve deduzir que os partidos agiriam de forma irracional ao conferir aos candidatos o mesmo nível de deferência ou status eleitoral (Nicolau, 2006;Klein, 2007;Braga e Amaral, 2013). Segundo Cheibub e Sin (2020) Por sua vez, vários estudos empíricos recentes demonstram que os partidos: (a) lançam em média muito menos candidatos do que a magnitude do distrito (Braga, Veiga e Miríade, 2009; Cheibub e Sin, 2020); (b) exercem diferentes formas de controle sobre o processo de seleção de candidatos, aqui incluído o uso de comissões provisórias (Braga, 2008;Guarnieri, 2009;Bolognesi, 2013;Braga, Costa e Fernandes, 2018; Cervi e Borba, 2019); (c) otimizam recursos partidários e tempo de televisão, hierarquizando a lista conforme os diferentes status dos candidatos (Schmitt, Carneiro e Kuschnir, 1999); e (d) adotam critérios para evitar a sobreposição territorial, identitária e ocupacional dos candidatos (Braga e Amaral, 2013;Silotto, 2019;Souza e Graça, 2019).…”
Section: Revisão Teóricaunclassified