A Reform-Minded Status Quo Power? China, the G20, and Changes in the International Monetary System

Ren, Xiao

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2169845

Cited by 6 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…Further research might look beyond the realm of financial regulation to discover the conditions under which emerging powers such as China exceed global standards. Ren (2012) argues that China is taking conscious steps to signal a non-revisionist stance in the G20 while pushing for reform within the existing order. Over-compliance with global standards might also endow rising powers with reputational benefits in areas other than trade and finance.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…And China's financial supervisors have not yet accumulated regulatory experience and capacity equivalent to that of their colleagues from advanced economies (Walter 2016). As a consequence, and contrary to expectations that the inclusion of emerging market economies would lead to tension in global financial governance, the newcomers have largely supported the post-crisis regulatory reform agenda (Kahler 2013;Ren 2012;Véron 2016). This article draws two lessons from current scholarship in this field.…”

Section: China In International Financial Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 92%

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An Unlikely Champion of Global Finance: Why is China Exceeding International Banking Standards?

Knaack

2017

Journal of Current Chinese Affairs

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As a G20 member, China has been engaged in financial reform since the end of the global financial crisis. A core piece of this reform is Basel III, the new prudential standard issued by the Basel Committee. Rather than being merely compliant, China's banking regulation is stricter than the global standard and being implemented ahead of the international timetable. Why is China voluntarily subjecting itself to tougher regulatory standards than the rest of the world? This article shows that low adjustment costs, factional politics, and, above all, an unusual alignment of domestic interests in the quest for international reputation are driving this phenomenon. The troubled institutional history of China's financial system motivates all relevant stakeholders to seek external validation in order to address a credibility gap abroad, albeit for different reasons. The article examines the power of reputation as a driver of regulatory positioning in the context of China's integration into international financial institutions.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: China In International Financial Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 92%

An Unlikely Champion of Global Finance: Why is China Exceeding International Banking Standards?

Knaack

2017

Journal of Current Chinese Affairs

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“…96 In terms of global economic governance, the speed, scope and scale of China's growing economic power have created pressures for readjustment on the United States and other 'great (ir)responsibles' in the global economy-so much so that one Chinese scholar claims that any reform of global economic governance 'would not be realistic without China's participation'. 97 It is true that, like other rising powers, the Chinese will 'aim to place their imprint on reconstructed global institutions, and the stamp will differ markedly from a status quo supported by the incumbent powers'. 98 That China is unhappy about the existing global economic governance architecture based on the so-called Bretton Woods system, and is a staunch advocate of its reform, has been widely noted.…”

Section: China As the Second Among 'Great (Ir)responsibles'mentioning

confidence: 99%

China and liberal hierarchies in global international society: power and negotiation for normative change

Zhang

2016

International Affairs

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This article investigates the entanglement of the rising Chinese power with the liberal global order in negotiating for normative change. Drawing upon the English School theoretical perspective, it argues that three hierarchical constructs of liberal persuasion co‐exist in and cohabit the global international society today. They are, namely, the legalized hegemony as seen in the UN Charter‐based liberal pluralism; the changing normative order of emerging solidarist and anti‐pluralist formation that purposively creates unequal sovereigns; and the liberal global governance order that moves predominantly in the direction of state‐centric solidarism. As an emerging power with an authoritarian regime, China's entanglement with these liberal hierarchical constructs is multifaceted with complex dynamics. The article argues specifically that three differentiated strategic approaches have been developed by China in this entanglement: to defend liberal pluralism in the legalized hegemony; to contest liberal cosmopolitan anti‐pluralism in the changing normative order; and to endorse state‐centric solidarism with regard to the construction of a liberal global governance order. If they reflect a rising China's preferences of order construction, they also constitute an important part of China's engaging negotiations for normative change in international society. The agency China exercises in this regard helps explain the limited consensus among Great Powers as to the ‘central direction’ for the evolving global order. The preferences of China as the second among equals in the Great Power club matter greatly in understanding the contention between pluralism and solidarism in the changing raison de système of contemporary global international society.

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“…Likewise, a few years ago, when China had an opportunity to push for the election of managing director from the Southern countries, it did not do so. In exchange for Chinese support of Christine Legarde of France, Zhu Min of China was appointed a deputy managing director (Ren, ).…”

Section: Financementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moreover, China has actively collaborated with other developing countries in the G‐20, coordinating with other BRIC countries ahead of or alongside G‐20 meetings. Their collective action has produced some results, most notably the increasing representation of emerging powers at the IMF and the World Bank and the expansion of the Financial Stability Forum (Glosny, ; Ren, ).…”

Section: Financementioning

confidence: 99%

China in Global Economic Governance

Wang

French

2014

Asian Economic Policy Review

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China has made contradictory claims about its attitude toward the existing international order. Is China a "responsible stakeholder" in the existing international regimes? Or has China been a new type of great power seeking to reform the existing world order, making it more friendly toward the global South? In this article, we look beyond Chinese rhetoric and examine China's behavior in global economic governance. A comparison with other emerging powers and traditional major powers shows that China has been actively involved in global economic governance. But, thus far, China has not exercised substantive leadership nor has it pushed hard for change to benefit the developing countries. The level of its support of the current regimes varies across issue areas and is primarily driven by its changing economic interest.

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A Reform-Minded Status Quo Power? China, the G20, and Changes in the International Monetary System

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

An Unlikely Champion of Global Finance: Why is China Exceeding International Banking Standards?

An Unlikely Champion of Global Finance: Why is China Exceeding International Banking Standards?

China and liberal hierarchies in global international society: power and negotiation for normative change

China in Global Economic Governance

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