2013
DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12070
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A Primary Cause of Partisanship? Nomination Systems and Legislator Ideology

Abstract: Many theoretical and empirical accounts of representation argue that primary elections are a polarizing influence. Likewise, many reformers advocate opening party nominations to nonmembers as a way of increasing the number of moderate elected officials. Data and measurement constraints, however, have limited the range of empirical tests of this argument. We marry a unique new data set of state legislator ideal points to a detailed accounting of primary systems in the United States to gauge the effect of primar… Show more

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Cited by 124 publications
(60 citation statements)
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“…Yet we are still searching for reasons as to why Congress is becoming more and more polarized with almost each election cycle. There is little empirical evidence to support the claim that gerrymandering and primary election systems have had a substantial effect on congressional polarization (Hirano et al 2010;McCarty et al 2009;McGhee et al 2013; see also Sides and Vavreck 2013). And Fiorina et al (2006) further illustrate how extremist voters, or at least sorted ones, can elect moderate candidates if these candidates are positioned at the ideological center.…”
Section: The Decline Of Moderates In the Us Congressmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Yet we are still searching for reasons as to why Congress is becoming more and more polarized with almost each election cycle. There is little empirical evidence to support the claim that gerrymandering and primary election systems have had a substantial effect on congressional polarization (Hirano et al 2010;McCarty et al 2009;McGhee et al 2013; see also Sides and Vavreck 2013). And Fiorina et al (2006) further illustrate how extremist voters, or at least sorted ones, can elect moderate candidates if these candidates are positioned at the ideological center.…”
Section: The Decline Of Moderates In the Us Congressmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…3 These control variables account for candidate type (Jacobson, 1990;Jacobson and Kernell, 1983) (Gerber and Morton, 1998;Kaufmann, Gimpel and Hoffman, 2003;McGhee et al, 2014). We exclude all nonpartisan primaries.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The relationship between primary rules and candidate ideology follows the logic of spatial voting laid out by Downs (1957): closed primaries feature more partisan electorates and attract more ideologically extreme candidates, while the ideologically diverse electorates of open primaries attract more moderate candidates (Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart, 2001;Burden, 2004;Fiorina, 1999). However, other scholars argue that this relationship is not as clear as the Downsian story predicts and that different rules may lead to outcomes that defy Downsian logic (McGhee et al, 2014;Kanthak and Morton, 2001). …”
Section: Candidates and Constituenciesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Using data originally developed by Shor and McCarty (Shor & McCarty, 2011), McGee et al found little evidence to support the theory that primary types play an important role in polarization of legislatures (McGhee, Masket, Shor, Rogers, & McCarty, 2014). Moreover, the evidence found goes against the conventional wisdom, finding that rather than moderating candidates open primaries create more extreme partisans (Ibid).…”
Section: Party Primaries and Polarizationmentioning
confidence: 99%