A Nuclear Submarine in the South Atlantic: The Framing of Threats and Deterrence

Abstract

Abstract:In this article, we analyse one aspect of Brazilian nuclear policy during the tenure of the Workers Party (2003)(2004)(2005)(2006)(2007)(2008)(2009)(2010)(2011)(2012)(2013)(2014)(2015)(2016): the development of a nuclear-propelled submarine. We propose that the project of building a nuclear-propelled submarine has become possible partly because of the mobilisation of a set of arguments for the construction of the South Atlantic as a strategic area, framed in terms of security and development. On the other hand, we contend that the need for a nuclear-propelled submarine is framed through the mobilisation of a specific notion of deterrence. In other words, we claim that the notions of 'strategic area' , 'general deterrence' , 'conventional deterrence' , and 'deterrence by denial' can help us analyse the fundamental aspects involved in the framing of the South Atlantic as a security concern, justifying the nuclear-propelled submarine project.

The Defense-Development Nexus: Brazilian Nuclear Policy under the Workers’ Party Administrations

“…This text follows previous works(Herz et al 2016;2017) and is inscribed in a larger project (out of which a book will soon be published) in which we analyse the way Brazilian ruling elites have formulated, conducted and mainly how they framed (and justified) the Brazilian nuclear program.5 The relation between the project to build nuclear propelled submarines and security in the South Atlantic is discussed inHerz et al (2017). The defence development nexus will provide an additional interpretation of the refusal to sign the Additional Protocol and the skepticism regarding the proposals for the multilateral enrichment of uranium, since the framing of nuclear policy in terms of development will allow us to understand the Brazilian position regarding the preservation and advancement of its access to technology vis a vis the nuclear governance regime.The Defense-Development Nexus: Brazilian Nuclear Policy under the Workers' Party Administrations Rev.…”

Fator Coreia do Norte e a Política de Defesa Japonesa no século XXI: uma análise sobre as ações norte coreanas e a capacidade de dissuasão do Japão | The North Korea factor and Japanese defense policy in the 21st century: an analysis of North Korean actions and Japan’s deterrence capacity

“…Em outras palavras, um ator B será dissuadido de agir devido à ameaça de retaliação feita pelo ator A. Essa forma de dissuasão DOI: 10.12957/rmi.2023.73880| e-ISSN: 2177-73 busca dissuadir o agressor ao tornar o custo da ação futura proibitivamente alto, o que desencoraja a tomada de ação agressiva em primeiro lugar (Freedman, 2005;Mazarr, 2018). A perspectiva de punição, por exemplo, aumenta os custos de uma ação, potencialmente causando uma força hostil a desistir de um ataque (Herz;Dawood;Coutinho, 2017).…”

Role of the Indonesian Navy Task Unit to Supporting Technology Transfer of Submarine by Dsme South Korea-Pt Pal Indonesia

“…By having a submarine technology then Indonesia will align with state authorities submarine technology such as Germany, Russia, USA, France, China and Turkey (Herz, et al, 2017),Given the presence of the submarine can provide high deterrent effect the mastery of submarine technology and defense industry will boost the progress of the national authority in the region. This needs to be carried out considering a technology that is dynamic, constantly changing times.…”