A Model of Nongovernmental Organization Regulation with an Application to Uganda

Burger, Ronelle; Dasgupta, Indraneel; Owens, Trudy

doi:10.1086/682885

Cited by 4 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 22 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…More discriminating assessment of the benefits and costs of community participation as a donor conditionality, in alternative theoretical and empirical contexts, is evidently called for in light of this paper. Burger et al () discuss the problem of regulating NGOs by making grants to them conditional on their spending at least some pre‐determined proportion of revenue on direct project related expenses. An analogous exercise, carried out in the context of a threshold level of community participation, may yield useful policy‐relevant insights.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Under Museveni's more tolerant regime, the NGO sector expanded rapidly, with growth partly being fuelled by a significant rise in unemployment, which helped to boost the attractiveness of starting an NGO (see Nyangabyaki et al ). This expansion however has been associated with increasing evidence of large scale corruption and fund diversion in the NGO sector, leading to more emphatic demands for regulation (see Burger et al ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…On the issue of fund diversion by NGOs to managerial consumption, see Burger et al (), Aldashev and Verdier (), and Castaneda et al ().…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

WHY PAY NGOs TO INVOLVE THE COMMUNITY?

Burger

Dasgupta

Owens

2015

Ann Public Coop Econ

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract:We examine the case for donors providing financial incentives to, i.e. subsidizing, NGOs to increase community participation. We show that the introduction of such a 'participation subsidy' may reduce beneficiary welfare. Thus, eliminating community participation from the set of conditions for funding an NGO may in fact benefit target communities. We show how our theoretical analysis may be operationalized by applying it to data from the NGO sector in Uganda. Our empirical findings appear to reject the case for providing a participation subsidy in that context. Keywords:Regulation of non-governmental organizations, developing countries, community participation, Uganda JEL Classification Numbers: I38, L31, L38 We thank an anonymous referee for many helpful comments and suggestions.

show abstract

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

WHY PAY NGOs TO INVOLVE THE COMMUNITY?

Burger

Dasgupta

Owens

2015

Ann Public Coop Econ

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Governments, CSOs, and donor organizations interact to form “transnational topographies of power” (Ferguson, 2006), structuring global authority and governance. More recent scholarship investigating challenges to the development landscape (Burger et al, 2015; Hackenesch, 2013; Kragelund, 2014; Lange and Tjomsland, 2014; Nega and Schneider, 2014) demonstrate that while the aid industrial complex still thrives, various power and economic shifts, including the growing influence of China in Africa, may impact how African governments interact with traditional donors as well as civil society.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ephemeral Development Agendas and the Process of Priority Shifts in Malawi

Anderson

2016

Journal of Asian and African Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Drawing on 70 interviews with civil society staff in Malawi, I argue that when development trends and issues in the country change, at donors' wishes, organizations proactively strategize to vie for donor funds. Collected over three research trips, my data show that between 2008 and 2010 there was a widespread belief among civil society in Malawi that climate change was becoming the "it" issue, surpassing HIV/AIDS in predominance. Alongside this belief, there was a dynamic, if invisible, process of organizational repositioning. Comparing the earlier interviews with those conducted in 2014, I contend that the issues of focus, while interesting, are less telling than the ways Malawian organizations endeavor to adapt and respond to them. This paper adds a critical dimension to development literature, investigating a process that occurs when development agendas change.

show abstract

Samaritan Bundles: Fundraising Competition and Inefficient Clustering in NGO Projects

Aldashev

Marini

Verdier

2020

The Economic Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

ABSTRACT This article provides a theoretical framework to understand the tendency of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to cluster and the circumstances under which such clustering is socially undesirable. NGOs compete through fundraising for donations and choose issues to focus their projects on. Donors have latent willingness-to-give that may differ across issues, but they need to be ‘awakened' to give. Raising funds focusing on the same issue creates positive informational spillovers across NGOs. Each NGO chooses whether to compete in the same market (clustering) with spillovers, or to face weaker competition under issue specialisation. We show that equilibrium clustering is more likely to occur when the share of multiple-issue donors is relatively large, and when the fundraising technology is sufficiently efficient. Moreover, this situation is socially inefficient when the cost of fundraising takes intermediate values and the motivation for donors’ giving is relatively high. We illustrate the mechanisms of the model with several case studies.

show abstract

A Model of Nongovernmental Organization Regulation with an Application to Uganda

Cited by 4 publications

References 22 publications

WHY PAY NGOs TO INVOLVE THE COMMUNITY?

WHY PAY NGOs TO INVOLVE THE COMMUNITY?

Ephemeral Development Agendas and the Process of Priority Shifts in Malawi

Samaritan Bundles: Fundraising Competition and Inefficient Clustering in NGO Projects

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About