A media visibility analysis of public leadership in Scandinavian responses to pandemics

Abstract

This paper analyses public leadership in Scandinavia during the latest two pandemics, the swine flu pandemic in 2009 and the coronavirus pandemic in 2020, by compiling and contrasting national proxies of media visibility among pandemic response actors. Concretely, the paper taps into key media databases to develop indicators of how often national leaders and leading health experts are mentioned in Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish media reports about the 2009 and 2020 pandemics. The study reveals a high degree of continuity of public leadership in Sweden during the two pandemics. In contrast, Norway and in particular Denmark both moved from a predominately expertdriven media presence in 2009 to a much stronger top-down ministerial leadership presence during the 2020 coronavirus pandemic. In addition, Sweden also displays the most balanced media representation of health experts and cabinet ministers during both pandemics. The paper concludes by discussing the pros and cons of the outlined differences in public leadership and the possible practical implications with regards public debate and trust.

Experts as crisis managers: The case of the Swedish response to the Covid‐19 pandemic

“…This was also the case in beginning of the Covid‐19 pandemic for many expert agencies. It turned out that reliance on evidence‐based decision making is difficult at times when information and previous knowledge is lacking (Rubin et al, 2021). In fact, the combination of the impossibilities with evidence‐based decision making and the risk involved in not acting, and letting the virus spread uncontrollably is one of the key difficulties in coping with a public health crisis.…”

“…the elderly were ill‐founded, the authority should also for that reason have taken more intervention measures at the initial critical stage when the infection began to spread in the country’ (p. 656). The independence of Swedish authorities provide space for experts and technocrats to make decisions without the interference of political actors, yet, absence of politics makes political accountability difficult (Rubin et al, 2021).…”

“…According to Forster and Heinzel (2021) (2003) and MERS (2012) (Lee et al, 2020). Yet, other examples from the Covid-19 pandemic showed that many health authorities severely underestimated the risks associated with the Covid-19 virus (Rubin et al, 2021). Crisis scholars underline that expertise is no guarantee for high-quality decisions.…”

“…That previous experiences can be positive in dealing with the pandemic are for example illustrated by South Korea's effective response to the Covid‐19 outbreak, where the reasons for the success in combating Covid‐19 could be attributed to previous experiences of Corona virus outbreaks of SARS (2003) and MERS (2012) (Lee et al, 2020). Yet, other examples from the Covid‐19 pandemic showed that many health authorities severely underestimated the risks associated with the Covid‐19 virus (Rubin et al, 2021). Crisis scholars underline that expertise is no guarantee for high‐quality decisions.…”

Follow the science: The European public health community confronts the first wave of the COVID‐19 pandemic

“…In addition to lacking the authority or competencies to direct the pandemic response, its weaker fiscal base and a leadership transition rendered the organization vulnerable to political pressure. More specifically, the government repeatedly interfered in analytic exercises (Baekkeskov et al, 2021, p. 1330; Baldwin, 2021; Folketinget, 2021), from the introduction of an extreme precautionary principle on March 14 (Rubin & de Vries, 2020, p. 288) to the withholding of statistics and the introduction of more pessimistic specifications into modeling activities (Rubin et al, 2021, p. 544). In short, by March 12, public health expertise was replaced in large measure by political authority.…”